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INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a significant amount of interest in socalled “social enterprises.” While there is no precise definition of a
social enterprise, “[t]he working definition . . . is that a social
enterprise is one organized and operated for the dual purpose
of engaging in profit-making activity and furthering a social good.”1
Thus, a social enterprise is thought to occupy a borderland between
two sectors of society: the business sector and the charitable or social
sector.
The social enterprise movement has been accompanied by what
might best be called a social enterprise legal reform movement. Legal
reformers take the position that social enterprises are overly
constrained by a regulatory environment that puts enterprises in one
of two boxes: either the enterprise is a for-profit business or it is a nonprofit charity.2 In response to this perceived limitation of current law,
1

Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in
Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 5 (2010). See also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice
of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 337 (2009) (discussing “socalled hybrid social enterprises, which combine the soul of nonprofit organizations
with the discipline and business savvy of for-profits”). Generally, social enterprises are
differentiated from businesses who seek to use some (or all) of their profits from one
activity to advance a separate social good. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The
Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 91–92 (2010) (distinguishing a for-profit social
enterprise in which commercial activities directly affect mission from an enterprise in
which commercial activities merely provide a source of revenue to support the
mission). For a more functionally limited definition that is arguably more useful, see
Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations 1 (Yale Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 485, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379012 (“The common characteristic of social
enterprises is that they have a transactional relationship with their beneficiaries.”).
2
See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose With Profit: Governance,
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies,
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (citing Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer’s
Perspective, PERLMAN & PERLMAN LLP, http://www.pearlmanandpearlman.com/
publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf) (“Even with the help of the most
experienced attorneys skilled in structuring such arrangements, the lack of a
convenient legal form, designed to accommodate the dual goals of profit and charity,
remains the ‘single greatest challenge’ of social enterprises.”). See also Kelley, supra
note 1 at 340–44 (arguing that social entrepreneurs believe that “outmoded law and
inappropriate old-style legal entities hamstring their socially transformative plans”);
Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1362 (2011) (“The push for new forms reflects
dissatisfaction with the seemingly binary nature of existing options.”); Susannah Camic
Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118 PENN. STATE L. REV. 489,
491–92 (2014) (“Tax law patrols the nonprofit border carefully [and the laws] view
sectorial border-crossings with suspicion.”); Robert A. Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal
Context, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233, 233 (2006) (“[Social entrepreneurs must] work
within a tax regime that is sometimes not flexible enough to accommodate these new
ideas and new methods.”).
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social enterprise legal reformers seek to create a third “hybrid” legal
form to facilitate social enterprise. They seek to create a legal or
regulatory environment better suited to the dual social and financial
purposes of social enterprises. If success can be measured by changes
to the law, these legal reformers have been surprisingly successful.3
Many states have enacted laws to provide new business entity
designations for social enterprises, and such new business-form
statutes include benefit corporations, L3Cs, flexible purpose
corporations, benefit LLCs, and others.4
A significant focus of social enterprise legal reformers is
“deregulatory,” in the sense that the new business forms are intended
to free social enterprises from a variety of laws that constrain the
“traditional” non-profit sector.5 High on the list of legal regimes that
are perceived to be overly restrictive is the federal law of charities6
contained in the Internal Revenue Code.7 These federal tax laws
permit charitable organizations to earn money tax-free and to receive
tax-deductible contributions.8 These benefits are accompanied by a
list of restrictions.9
Prominent among the restrictions is the
requirement that tax-exempt charitable organizations operate as nonprofits. That is, under the so-called “no inurement” rule, tax-exempt
organizations are prohibited from distributing any net earnings or
other “excess benefit” to shareholders or any other person who is in a
position to control the organization (so-called “disqualified
persons”).10 This no-inurement rule does not prevent tax-exempt

3

See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2025 (2013)
(“Social enterprise lawmaking is a growth industry.”). As Robert T. Esposito has
pointed out, “These entities have consistently received bipartisan political support.”
Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging
Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 648 (2013).
4
Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making Sense of Those
Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-ofthose-confusing-choices/.
5
See Wexler, supra note 2, at 233 (“This article is a call to action to the exempt
organization legal community to help . . . change the law to accommodate new
approaches to philanthropy.”).
6
This Article is primarily concerned with organizations described in Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which I generally refer to as “charities.”
7
Social enterprise legal reformers sometimes argue that the new laws are
necessary to avoid state corporate law as well, although many commentators point out
that this concern is probably exaggerated.
8
See I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3), & 170 .
9
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
10
See discussion infra at Section II(A).
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charities from engaging in income-generating activities, or even from
making substantial profits year after year. But it does prevent them
from having owners who share in those profits, and social enterprise
legal reformers point out that this prohibition can make it difficult to
raise sufficient capital to engage in some socially beneficial activities,
especially if a social enterprise has the potential to both make money
and do good.11
The new social enterprise legal forms take two very different
approaches to the “deregulatory” goals.
Some, like Benefit
Corporations, seek to completely avoid federal charity law. Benefit
Corporations do not expect to have donors making tax-deductible
contributions to them and they do not generally seek money from
organizations that have received such contributions. Instead, they
hope to find investors who are willing to accept a potentially lower
financial return in order to advance a social purpose.12 As long as they
do not take any money from tax-exempt charities, the federal law of
charities does not apply to them, and they have accomplished the
deregulatory impulse. From the perspective of federal tax law, they are
exactly the same as any other for-profit corporate entity.
Other social enterprise legal forms do not completely avoid the
federal law of charities because they seek to combine charitable funds
with profit-driven investors. The most notable of these new forms is
the L3C, but lawyers have been experimenting for years with
mechanisms for combining charitable and for-profit funds in “hybrid”
business entities that make use of separate “tranches” of business and
11

See Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable
Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 685 (2012)
(“Desperately in need of capital, a social entrepreneur therefore dreams about a legal
vehicle that not only allows private ownership and investment, but one that also may
receive private foundation grants and charitable contributions. Currently, there is no
such legal entity.”). In Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 337, 354 (2009), Thomas Kelley writes:
Social entrepreneurs’ difficulty raising start-up or expansion capital has
driven many away from the nonprofit sector, but their capitalization
problems are not entirely solved by choosing to launch as for-profit
ventures. As an initial matter, for-profit social entrepreneurs generally
cut themselves off from the sources that traditionally have funded
socially beneficial activities—private foundations and governments.
See also Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 17 (“The obstacle in raising capital is
sometimes said to be the most significant challenge for social entrepreneurs who turn
to existing for-profit forms.”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual
Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (“‘[C]haritable forms’ limited funding
streams—from donations, debt-financing, and earned revenue—are precisely what
have turned the interest of many social entrepreneurs to blended enterprise.”).
12
See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications,
and Benefit Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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social investors. In this article, I call these hybrid entities “tranched
social enterprises” whether they are L3Cs, LLCs, partnerships, or even
simple contractual joint venture arrangements.13 Because these
business forms seek to use charitable funds, they do not avoid the law
that applies to tax-exempt charities. Social enterprise legal reformers
focusing on “hybrid” entities, like the L3C, pursue the deregulatory
goal by seeking to change the law to make hybrids more accessible, but
they do not generally explicitly argue that the law should be changed
to free such entities from the no-inurement rule.14 The point of these
organizations is that they are permitted to have investors who receive
the profits from the enterprise’s activities, but to the degree to which
they have charitable donors or investors, the law of private inurement
still applies to those charities, creating potential restrictions on the
enterprise’s use of the charity’s money.
But there is a problem with the scholarship on all of these new
social enterprise business forms. It tends to treat the deregulatory
impulse as primarily an attempt to clear away unnecessary confusion
in the law. This scholarship often acknowledges that the no-inurement
rule is important to prevent diversion of funds intended for social
purposes into the pockets of investors or other stakeholders.15 But no
13

Christopher C. Archer, Comment, Private Benefit for the Public Good: Promoting
Foundation Investment in the ‘Fourth Sector’ to Provide More Efficient and Effective Social
Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2011) (“[T]he L3C blueprint uses a PRI to
leverage a market return for profit-seeking investors in a tranched, that is, multilayered, investment strategy.”); Thomas Kelley, supra note 1, at 373–74 (describing a
“tiered investment strategy” with three “tiered investment tranches” including a “social
outcomes” tier that would not receive any significant financial return, an “intermediate
tier” that would provide a lower-than-market return, and a “market-rate tier” that
would “attract capital from private-sector investors such as venture capitalists and
financial institutions”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social
Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 418–19 (2014) (“L3C advocates promote L3Cs as being
particularly amenable to a tranched finance structure whereby private foundations
make high-risk, low-return PRI infusions into the L3C, thereby attracting socially
minded and traditional market members who make lower-risk and higher-return
investments.”); Katz & Page, supra note 2, at 1363–64 (describing three tranches: a
“program-related” tranche that would “ideally take the riskiest position in the capital
structure and receive no or lower returns,” a “mezzanine” tranche “designed for
investors willing to accept a lower return because of their contribution to social
welfare,” and a “top tranche” that “might be at the risk-adjusted market rate of
return”).
14
See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 244 (“Ultimately, though, the hybrid entity that
[a hypothetical social entrepreneur] dreams about, an entity that could receive grants
and also have investors, does not exist under U.S. law.”).
15
See, e.g., Archer, supra note 13, at 161 (“One of the primary issues in using this
strategy is whether a foundation’s participation in the L3C’s tranched investment
structure violates fundamental rules regarding nonprofit operations, thereby
threatening the foundation’s exempt status.”); Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC
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scholarly article to date has systematically addressed the application of
the no inurement rule in the social enterprise context.16 This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that there is a surprising lack of certainty
about how this most basic principle of the federal law of charities—the
no inurement rule—applies to tranched social enterprises.
This Article provides the first detailed examination of the impact
of the no-inurement regime in the context of tranched social
enterprises.17 It argues that the no inurement regime should absolutely
prohibit people who are so-called “disqualified persons” from profiting
from investments in social enterprises if the charity they control is a
donor or investor. This reading of the no inurement rule is justified
for the same reasons it is justified in the charitable context: because
the interests of “independent” decision-makers are better aligned with
the charitable or social goals of an organization—goals which are
supported by donors to charitable organizations and the government
who has provided tax subsidies to support these goals. A tranched

(L3C): Program-Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 245 (2010)
(“Of course, no matter how PRI status is achieved, that status does not sanction private
inurement”); Id. at 265 (“The tranche-investment notion potentially violates the
private-inurement restriction.”); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion:
Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273 (2010); Daniel S.
Kleinberger & J. William Callison, When the Law is Understood—L3C No 3 (William
Mitchell C.L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-07, 2010)
(“Tranched investing runs the risk of exporting these privileges to benefit noncharitable businesses, managers, and investors.”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth
Deconstructed: The ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (2010); Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 50 (“We believe,
however, that . . . the IRS will not look favorably on this type of arrangement.”); Dana
Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Financial
Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1524 (2013) (“[S]ocial investors
need assurances that their willingness to sacrifice financial returns will not merely
provide a windfall to entrepreneurs.”); Wexler, supra note 2, at 244 (“To be credible,
those entities would have to contain strict prohibitions on any excess benefits to
insiders.”).
16
The most extensive scholarly treatments to date are Archer, supra note 13; and
Brewer, supra note 11, at 697–706.
17
There are also state law doctrines that affect tranched social enterprises, such
as the state law duty of loyalty. See Ellen Aprill, Reconciling Nonprofit Self-Dealing Rules,
Volume 48 A.B.A. REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J., (forthcoming Winter 2014) (manuscript
at 5) (“The challenge of ensuring that nonprofit officers and directors (or trustees)
do not violate their duty of loyalty, including by engaging in self-dealing, represents a
key problem of nonprofit organizations.”). Although, “the duty of loyalty owed by
trustees of charitable trusts and directors of charitable corporations under state law is
now largely eclipsed by federal tax laws that effectively regulate fiduciary behavior.”
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity Fiduciaries
under United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L. J. 645, 646 (2011). This Article addresses only
the federal law of charities.
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social enterprise should not be permitted to avoid the no inurement
regime simply because it has moved those funds one step away from
the direct control of the charity that collected them. This may seem
like an excessively modest proposal, but it is by no means the consensus
view among social enterprise legal reformers.
There is an additional benefit to clarifying the meaning of the noinurement regime in the tranched social enterprise context. The
social enterprise legal reform movement arguably has not only
“deregulatory” goals, but also “regulatory” ones. In order to be
successful, social enterprises need to make credible claims to various
stakeholders—investors, customers, workers and others—that they are
really different from ordinary businesses . . . that they are really
pursuing their social goals.18 The new legal forms seek to provide
various stakeholders with credible means of detecting and enforcing
the particular balance of social and financial good that the enterprise
will pursue. So, for example, benefit corporation statutes generally
require benefit corporations to have their social impact measured
against some third-party standard and they may give certain
stakeholders the right to sue the corporation for failing to pursue its
social goals or for failing to balance social with financial goals. This
“regulatory” impulse seeks to provide new legal mechanisms to
adjudicate between competing visions of the proper balance between
social and financial goals.
This Article argues that the federal law of charities provides
another mechanism to assist social enterprises to make credible
commitments to their stakeholders about the balance of social and
financial goals. It is not an argument that starting fresh with new
mechanisms, as we are doing with benefit corporations, is a bad idea.
But it is an argument that—at least with respect to the core concerns
of the law of charities, which is preventing misappropriation of
charitable funds—the extension of charity law to social enterprises
provides a better solution, even for “mixed-purpose” investors. In
other words, even if one wants to make a financial investment in a
social enterprise rather than a charitable contribution, he would be
better off investing in a tranched social enterprise under a clarified
extension of the no-inurement regime than he would be in a social
enterprise that avoided the law of charities entirely. That is because
an independent charitable tranche provides the best oversight of a for18

See, e.g., Eldar, supra note 1, at 20–21 (“Standard economic theory is very
suspicious of subsidizing corporations. There is a general concern that subsidies fail
to achieve their purpose and may be expropriated by those who control the
organization.”).
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profit enterprise, and any individual investor or donor can free-ride on
the decisions independent charities make about how to structure their
sharing of power.
Finally, however, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that
there is a lot of uncertainty in the law of charities that is not justified
by the desire to prevent the diversion of charitable funds away from
their proper purposes. Thus, social enterprise legal reformers are by
no means wrong when they call for simplification of the law to facilitate
social entrepreneurship. For example, the law of private benefit—
often confused or conflated with the law of private inurement19—is very
poorly defined and arguably is a significant barrier to tranched social
enterprises, even when these enterprises observe the inurement laws.
The law of charitable “joint ventures” is unclear and creates
impediments to social enterprises that are arguably not fully justified
by concerns about diversion of charitable dollars. The law of private
foundations’ program-related investments is complicated and
uncertain as well, again inhibiting social enterprises without a clear
justification. Thus, while this Article defends the clear extension of the
law of inurement to the social enterprise context in a restrictive way, it
also argues that these other doctrines should be clarified and
potentially liberalized. That is because they arguably prevent tranched
social enterprises from employing the full range of possible
commitment devices and thus are overly restrictive.20
This Article proceeds in four sections. First, it describes
“tranched” social enterprises and the “subsidy problem” that they
create. Second, it describes the “private inurement regime” and
applies it in the tranched social enterprise context. Third, it argue that
the best interpretation of the private inurement regime is a simple rule
prohibiting investing by persons who are disqualified persons with
respect to any charitable investor. This section uses the so-called
“agency theory” to argue that the no-inurement rule is fully justified
when charitable funds are being used. But it also argues that tranched
social investments have benefits for social investors even when they are
investing with funds that carry no tax benefit. For these investors—the
same people who may be tempted to invest in business forms that avoid
the federal law of tax-exempt organizations altogether—a tranched
investment structure is better because it enables them to free-ride on
19

See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on
Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 29 (2006) (“These
doctrines are often incorrectly used interchangeably.”).
20
For a discussion of the range of commitment devices used by non-profits to bind
social enterprises to their social missions, see Eldar, supra note 1, at 41–47.
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the monitoring and enforcing efforts of the controllers of the
charitable tranche. Finally, it briefly describes the aspects of the
federal law of charities that are not as well justified as the inurement
rule, and makes some modest proposals about how they could be
clarified and liberalized.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TRANCHED INVESTING
Imagine that you are a social entrepreneur. That is, you want to
further a social good, and are willing to think creatively about how to
do it.21 Previously, while working in Mozambique, you discovered that
poor people in poor countries cook primarily on charcoal cookstoves.
Cooking on charcoal cookstoves is bad for poor people because these
cookstoves are unhealthy and unsafe.22 In addition, cooking on
charcoal cookstoves is bad for the environment because burning
charcoal produces CO2 and other pollutants and because charcoal is
made from wood, which is harvested from local forests. Cutting down
trees to make charcoal produces deforestation, which speeds global
warming.
Instead of using charcoal-burning cookstoves, poor people could
use cleaner-burning, safer, non-deforesting ethanol-burning
cookstoves. In your opinion, a sweeping shift from charcoal to ethanol
would help the environment and improve the lives of poor people
simultaneously—a win-win.
But ethanol cookstoves are more
expensive than charcoal cookstoves, even though ethanol is unlikely to
be more costly than charcoal.
Because an ethanol revolution would have both distributive
effects (helping poor people) and produce global public goods
(reducing CO2 emissions), it is the kind of thing that philanthropists
may well be interested in. Because the existence of an ethanol market
where none previously existed has the potential to make someone a lot
of money, it is the kind of thing capitalists may well be interested in.23
21

See Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59 (defining a “social entrepreneur” as “an
ambitious person who seeks social change on a large scale, characteristically through
earned income strategies”).
22
See, e.g., John M. Broder, Developing Nations to Get Cleaner Burning Stoves, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/science/earth/
21stove.html (“Every year, according to the United Nations, smoke from these stoves
kills 1.9 million people, mostly women and children, from lung and heart diseases and
low birth weight.”).
23
An estimated 800 million people cook with charcoal in Africa alone and ethanol
can be produced cheaply. See Brian Merchant, Charcoal Kills 2 Million People & Vast
Swaths of Forest Every Year. Brian Merchant, Can Biofuel Stop the Carnage?, TREEHUGGER
(May 16, 2012), www.treehugger.com/renewable-energy/africa-cooking-charcoalkills-millions.html (“Some 80% of Africans still rely on solid-based fuels like wood,
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And, in fact, philanthropists and capitalists may be mutually
interdependent on each other for success in reaching their respective
goals. Without the philanthropists providing some sort of subsidy for
the purchase of cookstoves, the ethanol cookstove revolution might
not get off the ground. But without a stable supply of ethanol, it will
not be sustainable. Without a subsidy, poor women in Mozambique
will continue to cook with charcoal; without a reliable market, you may
well find them cooking with charcoal on the fancy ethanol stoves some
charity gave them—another failed development project.
Being an entrepreneurial type, you create the Ethanol Cookstove
for Poor People Project (the “Cookstove Project” or “the Project”) to
catalyze the social change that you think will benefit both poor people
and the environment. The Cookstove Project must raise “charitable”
funds to subsidize the production or acquisition of ethanol cookstoves.
But it also must ensure that sufficient funds can be raised to capitalize
the creation of a stable ethanol supply market, and so the Cookstove
Project may also want to raise for-profit investment funds. Thus, the
Cookstove Project is a sort of “hybrid” that seeks to use both the power
of capitalists and philanthropists (and, possibly, mixtures of the two)
to advance the social good. Capitalists, philanthropists and mixtures
each require a different bundle of rights and expectations for their
respective investments, and so the Cookstove Project needs to
accommodate multiple investment “tranches.”
How should you organize the Cookstove Project, and what
restrictions might you encounter if you organize it as a tranched social
enterprise?
-----------------------------------------------------

A. At Least Two Purposes: Social and Financial
As described above, the Cookstove Project has potentially at least
two distinct types of benefits: (i) on the one hand, it has “social”
benefits, since it has the potential to increase health among poor
people and slow global warming; (ii) on the other hand it has
“financial” benefits because it has the potential to make money for
investors in an ethanol supply chain. It also has at least two challenges
to meeting its objectives: (i) cookstoves are too expensive for poor
people to buy without some kind of subsidy; and (ii) creating a reliable
regional ethanol supply chain is a large and capital-intensive
enterprise. Thus, the Cookstove Project has to find funds for two
dung, and especially charcoal for cooking.”).
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activities: providing subsidized stoves to poor people and creating and
operating an ethanol supply chain. Both challenges have to be met for
either benefit to accrue, and both benefits accrue once the two
challenges have been met.
One could imagine a situation in which the potential financial
benefit is sufficiently large and certain that it would justify the
provision of the subsidy by investors, even if those investors were
merely seeking a financial return. In other words, you could imagine
an investor thinking to herself, “Let’s give away ethanol cookstoves for
free instead of charging what they cost to make; we can make up these
initial losses through ethanol sales later on.” It is not uncommon when
businesses seek to build a customer base for them to give something
away for free. This phenomenon is so familiar to us in the twenty-first
century that some have predicted that it will become the dominant
business model.24 If the probability of profit is certain enough to justify
the initial investment, then the project can proceed in a traditional,
for-profit structure. Social benefits will accrue as an extra benefit from
the investors seeking a financial return.
One could also imagine a situation in which the social goals are
so compelling that a non-profit charity could raise sufficient capital
from donors to fully fund the Cookstove Project. In that case, donors
would provide not just the money to buy free cookstoves for poor
people, but also sufficient capital to get the ethanol supply chain up
and running. The non-profit charity that was created to operate the
Project would then receive all of the profits from the provision of
ethanol and it could use that money to expand its operations to other
parts of the world, or to make ethanol cheaper, or to research other
ways to benefit the health of poor people or reduce carbon emissions.
There might be some limitations on the organization to make sure that
the operation of this profitable business does not violate any laws,25 but
these challenges are really quite manageable, especially if the nonprofit charity is willing to pay taxes on the income it makes from its
ethanol business.26
24

See CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: HOW TODAY’S SMARTEST BUSINESSES PROFIT BY GIVING
SOMETHING FOR NOTHING (2010). But, obviously, the sales strategy of giving away
something for free or selling it below cost in the hope of inducing profitable
transactions on other products—generally called a “loss leader”—was common before
the 21st Century.
25
Among other things, the so-called “commerciality doctrine” may constrain
some of the ways the organization conducts its business. See generally BRUCE HOPKINS,
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.7, 4.11 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing the
Commensurate Test and Commerciality Doctrine respectively).
26
Tax-exempt organizations pay tax on income from an “unrelated trade or
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Finally, one could imagine a world in which two completely
separate entities engage in the two distinct activities. A charitable nonprofit solicits donations to subsidize the purchase of ethanol stoves or
give them away. Simultaneously, a commercial for-profit business
raises the investment capital to create and operate an ethanol supply
business. There is no legal impediment to these two entities each
pursuing its own distinct purpose, each making use of its own distinct
source of funding.27
But, if one could imagine a world like the three described above,
it is at least as easy to imagine a world that is not like those three. For
example, for an investor seeking a purely financial return, the
predicted return from the distribution of ethanol might not be large
enough, or assured enough, to justify an initial investment in giving
away free ethanol cookstoves. For a charity, the potential social benefit
of helping people cook on cleaner, more environmentally friendly
stoves might not be compelling enough to convince enough donors to
give enough money to both give away free stoves and build and operate
an ethanol supply chain. That is a lot of upfront costs for a social
benefit that is hard to measure and might not be as beneficial as it
initially seems. Finally, there might be good reasons not to pursue the
Cookstove Project through two distinct unrelated entities. The
organizations might want to coordinate with each other, since each
one’s success is dependent on the other. From the charity’s
perspective, some choices the ethanol distributor might make may be
extremely relevant to its social mission. For example, it turns out that
the environmental benefits of ethanol are greatly diminished if
farmers clear-cut forests to provide land to grow the crop that is
distilled into ethanol.28 The charity may want to influence the ethanol
supplier’s policies to ensure that deforestation does not occur, and the
only way to do so may be to have some sort of ongoing control over, or
influence on, the ethanol supplier. From the ethanol supplier’s
perspective, some choices of the charity may be extremely relevant. It
may be that a myriad of business considerations go into the question
of where it is feasible to distribute ethanol cost effectively, and so the
ethanol supplier may want to influence where free stoves are
distributed (and when, and how quickly, and with what instructions,

business” under I.R.C. §§ 511–14.
27
See, e.g., ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §12.02[4]
(2009).
28
See, e.g., Sabrina Valle, Losing Forests to Fuel Cars, WASH. POST (July 31, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/30/AR20070730
01484.html
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etc.).
B. Blending Different Types of Capital
The Cookstove Project is an example of a social enterprise that
seeks initial funding from at least two sources. First, because it is
conceived as a way to improve the lives of very poor people while
simultaneously slowing global warming, it is hoping to find donors who
want to support it for altruistic purposes. Let us call the funds received
by the Cookstove Project from these sources “charitable funds.” It is
worth pointing out that these funds may come from several sources.
They may be from altruistic individuals who want to improve the world.
They may come from existing charitable entities with environmental
or sustainable-development missions. These existing charitable
entities may be so-called “private foundations” or they may be so-called
“public charities.”29 Funds may come from business corporations
seeking to be, or appear, responsible or philanthropic. Funds may
even come from governments seeking to advance environmental or
sustainable-development goals.
In their purest form, charitable funds would come as “donations”
or “grants,” in which the contributing person parts with his money and
does not expect any sort of financial remuneration. In this case, the
only return received by the contributing person is the amelioration of
poverty or illness and the benefits to the environment.30 If the funds
were contributions from individuals or businesses, the donors may
receive a tax deduction for making the contribution. If they come
from charities, the donors to the charity may have received a tax
deduction when they made the contribution to the donor charity. If
they came from a government, there was no tax deduction because
governments do not pay taxes. But, in any case, charitable funds are
funds that are provided at least potentially under circumstances in which
a donor could have received a government subsidy in the form of a
charitable contribution deduction.31
29

A “private foundation” is a subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations to which
some greater legal restrictions apply. See I.R.C. §§ 509, 4940–46.
30
Of course, there may be many personal non-financial benefits of donating to
charity. These are sometimes collectively called “warm glow,” although they may
include status, building goodwill, developing personal alliances or connections, and
others. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (2010).
31
It is not entirely uncontroversial to describe the tax provisions related to
charities as “subsidies,” but, it has become the norm to do so. See, e.g., Miranda Perry
Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and The Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601,
608–09 (2011) (“Although a few scholars believe that exemption and deductibility are
necessary for measurement reasons, the more accepted view is that these provisions
serve as subsidies that contribute to the size and success of the charitable sector.”).
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Second, because the Cookstove Project has the potential to
generate revenue, and even substantial profits, it hopes to find
investors who are motivated by the promise of financial returns on
their investment. Again, these funds may come from a variety of
sources. They may come from individuals, or investment funds, or
businesses, or even charitable organizations or governments. All these
sources use financial investments to make money that they use to
advance their interests. To the degree to which the motivation of these
sources is to make money, they may want to make as much money as
they could with investments of comparable risk profiles available in the
market generally. In other words, if these sources are seeking a “pure”
investment, they are seeking a financial return that is the same or
greater than the return they could expect to receive from other
investments made with no specific charitable purpose. Let us call
funds received in which a contributing person seeks a return equal to
the return she could receive on any other investment “market-rate
investment funds.”
But, of course, people and institutions do not always have purely
charitable or purely financial motives. Sometimes their motives are
mixed. Funds may come from people or institutions primarily seeking
to advance the social purpose of the organization, but with some desire
for a financial return as well.32 Or, funds may come from people or
institutions primarily seeking a financial return, but who care very
deeply about the social purpose of the organization. Thus, charitable
funds may come in an impure form, in which the donor seeks to
receive some kind of financial return, and investment funds may come
in an impure form in which an investor seeks to ensure some social
good along with her financial return. The impure form of both of the
categories described above is funds provided with some expectation of
financial return, but not an expectation that the return will be as high
as could be obtained in the market generally.33 Let us call this third
32

What is true for people who contribute capital to a social enterprise is also true
for the founders, managers, and employees who provide labor to the enterprise. Those
who provide labor may do so wholly for charitable reasons (in which case they are
probably “volunteers”), wholly for financial reasons (in which case they presumably
seek the highest compensation they can obtain), or for some mixed charitable and
financial reasons (in which case they may accept “below-market” compensation in
exchange for their services. This issue is treated in some depth in Benjamin M. Leff,
The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819 (2012), in which I argue
that there is a range of possible compensation structures, and people often
misunderstand how much is permitted in non-profit organizations.
33
Much of the literature on social enterprise is premised on the idea that many
investors are seeking both a financial and a social return. The existence of a market
for socially responsible investments estimated at 3.3 trillion dollars suggests that

LEFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/15/2015 5:06 PM

PREVENTING PRIVATE INUREMENT

15

category “below-market investment funds.”34 Again, these funds may
come from a variety of sources, as people or institutions may have
numerous reasons for wanting some financial return even if their
motives are largely altruistic, and they may have numerous reasons to
demand a social return even if their motives are largely profitoriented.35
Given the fact that many investors have mixed motives when
investing in a social enterprise, it is worth thinking of investors as
existing along a spectrum. The farthest left pole represents purely
charitable capital. The farthest right pole represents purely profitdriven capital. Many investors in social enterprises fall somewhere
between the two poles, and those investors are potentially willing to
accept a below-market return on their investments.
A significant portion of the innovation among legal reformers is
to provide a legal entity that accommodates these below-market
investors. For example, the “benefit corporation” statutes are designed
to free corporate directors from a duty to maximize profits for their
shareholders while providing some mechanism for investors to
monitor some aspects of the social benefit of the corporation. But
entities like the benefit corporation are designed for social enterprises
with a single class of investors. The problems benefit corporations
attempt to solve are those associated with a dual mission, not those
associated with two or more actual classes of investors with different

investors are not solely concerned with financial returns. See U.S.S.I.F. FOUNDATION,
REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_
Summary.pdf.
34
Among other things, some argue that seeking a financial return may be one
strategy used to hold social enterprises accountable to their funders. See, e.g.,
MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE
THE WORLD (2008). For a thoughtful critique of the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism,
see Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753
(2011).
35
When funds are provided in a “mixed” form, the question of whether the
investor has received any sort of charitable subsidy from the government depends on
the charitable status of the investor. Thus, if you yourself are not a charity, the only
way to get a tax deduction for contributing funds that provide a financial return to the
investor is to donate them to a charity, and then have the charity receive the return on
the investment. Some commentators think this structure of the subsidy is either
inefficient or unfair. See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities,
93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2065 (2007); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate
Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009); Gautam
Jagannath, Using Nonprofits to Serve Charitable Goals of Social Businesses in the United States:
Circumventing the Lack of Recognition of the Social Business Model in the Federal Tax Code, 32
PACE L. REV. 239, 242 (2012) (“[I]f social business truly act charitably then they should
be conferred some tax advantages as well.”).
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interests.36
If you seek to accommodate at least two classes of investors who
lie in different places along the charitable-to-market spectrum, then
you need different “tranches” of investments. You need the possibility
for your investors to receive different returns on their investments. For
simplicity’s sake, in this Article, we will assume that there are two
tranches. The charitable tranche is closer to the charitable pole,
although it does not need to be “purely” charitable, and we will in fact
assume that it is not purely charitable;37 the market tranche is closer to
the profit-driven pole, even though its investors need not be “purely”
market driven. Ideally, the Cookstove Project would find a form of
organization that could tailor its investment options to investors at very
different places on the charitable-to-market-rate scale. That is what a
tranched investment strategy seeks to do. It seeks to provide different
investment options for investors who value social return and financial
return differently. Because the Cookstove Project has strong appeal to
philanthropists and strong appeal to capitalists, it seeks to provide a
mechanism by which philanthropists can invest in it in exchange for a
lower return and capitalists in exchange for a higher return so the
Project can access both sources of capital.
Thus, a “tranched investment strategy” is necessary if social
enterprises want to access capital from multiple sources, each of whom
seeks a different balance of social and financial ends. For several years,
scholars have been describing the ability to provide a tranched
investment strategy as a significant benefit to social enterprises seeking
capital.38
C. Tranched Investing
As discussed above, numerous legal scholars have referenced the
desire of social entrepreneurs to be able to make use of a tranched
investment strategy.39 It has most often been associated with the new
business form created for social enterprises called the Low-Profit
36

As Brian Galle points out, basic agency-cost theory suggests that dual-purpose
entities (like those that seek both a social and a financial bottom line) are likely to
generate monitoring costs so high as to make these entities inefficient except under
certain circumstances. See Galle, supra note 3, at 2031–33. This is especially true if the
dual-purpose entities have a single class of dual-purpose investors. This Article argues
that these costs are somewhat mitigated if there are at least two classes of investors and
if the law protects against private inurement by the charitable investors, as it would in
a non-profit structure.
37
See supra note 34.
38
See supra note 13.
39
See supra note 13.
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Limited Liability Company (“L3C”),40 but there is nothing preventing
one from using a tranched investment strategy with a traditional LLC
or any type of partnership, limited partnership, or even an old-school
business corporation.41
Every tranched investment strategy shares one characteristic: it
seeks to decrease the risk and/or increase the return for one set of
investors by increasing the risk or decreasing the return for another
set of investors. Imagine a two-tranche investment in the Cookstove
Project. Instead of separating the provision of free stoves and the
operation of the ethanol supply chain, a single entity would do both.
But that entity would be funded by two different types of investors.
A “senior” tranche would be made up of market-rate or quasimarket rate investors who have the right to payment of profits from the
operations before any profits are paid to the “junior” tranche. This
senior market tranche presumably would be made up of equity
investors,42 which may include the social entrepreneur and his family,
an independent angel investor, or multiple independent individual
investors (perhaps through some sort of crowdfunding).43 Let’s call
the senior market rate tranche of investors the “Subsidized Tranche,”
since it receives a potentially higher return than the other tranche.
The “junior” tranche would be made up of below-market
investors. This junior tranche could be made up of socially conscious
investors who are willing to risk very low or no return on their
investment because they care deeply about the social purpose of the
project. It could also be made up of a charity or charities that want to
40

See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 15; Callison & Vestal, supra note 15; Matt F.
Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2010); Kleinberger, supra note 15; Murray & Hwang, supra note
2; Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing the Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 619, 628 (2010).
41
See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11 (generally discussing the usefulness of various
business forms for tranched social enterprises and advocating a contract hybrid using
multiple LLCs).
42
Most other scholarly articles on tranched structures assume that the subsidizing
tranche will be made up of a loan, not an equity interest. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note
11. But in order to explore the legal issues in greater depth and scope, it is useful to
imagine that both the subsidized tranche and the subsidizing tranche are both equitytype investments, in that they are receiving a return on their investment based on the
net income of the venture.
43
Among social entrepreneurs, there is some hopeful optimism that small-scale
social investors may fund social enterprises through investments when they would not
have funded the same projects with pure donations. There have been incremental
changes to a variety of laws to make such investing a legal possibility. See Jenna
Wortham, Law Opens Financing of Startups to Crowds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/technology/law-opens-financing-of-start-upsto-crowds.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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make below-market investments. As discussed below, the distinction
between these two options is extremely important from a legal and
regulatory perspective.44 For the present, we will assume that the
investor in the junior below-market tranche is a charitable entity called
the Earth Charity, which is devoted to slowing global warming.
Whatever the nature of the Earth Charity’s investment or
donation to the Cookstove Project, the fundamental characteristic of
this junior tranche is that any financial return paid to the Earth Charity
will be paid only after a return has been paid to the Subsidized Tranche
(making it more risky), or it will be paid at a lower rate than the return
paid to the Subsidized Tranche (making it less potentially profitable),
or both. Let us call this tranche of investors the “Subsidizing Tranche,”
since it will receive a potentially lower or more risky return than the
Subsidized Tranche. Thus, there are two tranches: (i) a Subsidized
Tranche made up of private investors seeking a market or quasi-market
return on their investment who hold an equity interest; and (ii) a
Subsidizing Tranche made up only of the Earth Charity, a charitable
organization with an interest that is subordinate and provides a belowmarket return on its investment. While this structure is a simplification
of the tranched investment strategies proposed by prior
commentators, it contains the basic elements discussed by those
commentators.45
To be clear, the benefit that flows to social enterprises with a
tranched investment structure is not the benefit of tax exemption
itself. These entities are not non-profit tax-exempt organizations
under current law. While some commentators have begun to advocate
for these types of entities to be afforded tax benefits,46 Lloyd Mayer and
44

When no tax-exempt organization is involved in the transaction, the laws that
apply to tax exempt organizations do not apply, and so there are fewer legal issues, but
also less protection for below-market investors seeking a social return. See infra text
accompanying note 71..
45
See Reiser, supra note 40, at 628 (calling the charitable tranche, the “equity
tranche,” the market investment tranche the “senior tranche,” and the below-market
investment tranche the “mezzanine tranche”). See also Archer, supra note 13, at 174–
75 (describing a structure in which a private foundation takes on the highest risk and
an expected low return, a “socially responsible investor” takes on “moderate risk” and
an expected slightly higher return, and “a profit sector investor” takes “the lowest risk”
and an expected highest, but still moderate, return); Bishop, supra note 15, at 263
(“[T]he foundation tranche [is] allocated a high-risk L3C investment slice but with a
below-market return for such a risk. Having laid off the high risk and low return to
the foundation, the L3C may then market the low-risk, but above-average market
returns to attract commercial investors, all in the name of charity.”).
46
See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 390 (“[T]here have already been calls for
these forms to receive some or all of the tax benefits enjoyed by charities.”). See also
id. at 391 (“[S]ome commentators have supported the extension of the tax benefits
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Joseph Ganahl have made a compelling case that such benefits should
not be directly available to such entities.47 But because of the tranche
structure, some of the benefits that are afforded to tax-exempt
charities can be passed along to social enterprises in the form of a
subsidizing investment. In effect, the tranched structure allows a taxexempt charitable organization to receive tax benefits, in the form of
tax-deductible contributions or tax-free income, and then use those
benefits to reduce the cost of capital for the social enterprise in which
it invests.
The Subsidizing Tranche could be structured in a variety of ways
reflecting a variety of potential financial returns on the charity’s
investment. At one extreme, the Subsidizing Tranche could be a grant
or donation. A grant’s defining characteristic is that the donor
receives no financial return on its investment at all. Its sole return is
social, in the sense that it advances its social or charitable mission.
Obviously, in that case, the Subsidizing Tranche’s investment provides
a lower financial return because the financial return is zero. In the
middle of the spectrum, the Subsidizing Tranche could be structured
as a loan. A loan pays a fixed return as a percentage of the amount of
money provided. If the Subsidizing Tranche was structured as a loan,
it would pay a fixed return that was less than the entity could receive if
it tried to obtain a loan from a purely financial investor. The rate may
still be high compared to interest rates on relatively safe investments,
because market interest rates are determined based on predictions
about how certain one is that a borrower will be able to pay back the
principal and pay the interest. On the other end of the spectrum, the
investment could be structured as an equity interest in the Cookstove
Project. The defining characteristic of an equity interest is that it pays
a return that is not a fixed percentage of the amount borrowed, but a
percentage of the profits of the venture. In this scenario, the
Subsidizing Tranche would receive a return on its investment either
only after the Subsidized Tranche received a return of some amount
on its investment, or as a smaller percentage of the profits relative to
the amount of capital provided, or both. For the purposes of this
Article, we will assume that the Earth Charity takes a subordinate equity
interest in the Cookstove Project that pays a smaller return on its
capital investment than the Subsidized Tranche.
historically enjoyed by nonprofit entities to other types of entities that pursue the
public good.”).
47
See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 391 (“Our conclusion is that the bare fact
that hybrids have public-benefitting goals in addition to profit-seeking goals does not
provide sufficient grounds for giving hybrids these tax benefits for four reasons, each
of which arises from the difficulty of defining and policing ‘public benefit.’”).
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Because academic commentary has largely associated tranched
investing with the L3C, most of the legal analysis of tranched investing
has focused on the special rules that apply to so-called “programrelated investments” (“PRIs”). This focus is buttressed by a (perhaps
unfounded) belief that the most likely providers of social investments
are or will be private foundations.48 Private foundations are a
subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations, and they are subject to a series
of restrictions that other 501(c)(3) organizations do not face. For
example, private foundations are prohibited from making certain risky
investments49 and are required to distribute at least five percent of their
assets in grants every year.50 If an investment qualifies as a PRI, the
private foundation is free from the prohibition on risky investments51
and can count the full amount invested as part of its five percent
minimum distribution in the year in which the investment is made.52
Determining whether an investment in a social enterprise qualifies as
a PRI may be a complicated matter,53 and one significant goal of social
enterprise legal reformers has been to streamline that process,
presumably to unlock some potential investments currently hampered
by the restrictions on private foundations.54 This is a worthy task. But
the PRI rules apply only to private foundations, and so investments by
charities that are not private foundations do not need to comply with
them.55
48

See, e.g., Maximilian Martin & Arthur Wood, Unfreezing the Foundation Asset
Landscape to Create a Liquid Social Capital Market, TOTAL IMPACT ADVISORS 105,
http://www.totalimpactadvisors.com/sites/totalimpactadvisors.drupalgardens.com/f
iles/library_items/Copy%20of%20SSRN-%20Unfreezing%20Capital%20Markets.pdf
(“[C]haritable foundations emerge as a potentially major source of capital.”) (2008).
49
See I.R.C. § 4944.
50
See id. at § 4942.
51
See id. at § 4944(c).
52
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(c)(3)(ii)(d)(1983). For a general introduction
of PRI issues in a social enterprise context, see Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 24–
26.
53
As Brian Galle points out, “The details are boring for most readers.” Galle, supra
note 3, at 2042.
54
See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11, at 682 (“[B]oth the proponents and opponents
generally recognize that PRIs are underutilized”); Martin & Wood, supra note 48, at
105 (“[C]haritable foundations emerge as a potentially major source of capital.”).
55
See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (exception for program-related investments from jeopardy
investment rule, which applies only to private foundations); but see James P. Joseph,
Program-Related Investments and You—Perfect Together, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 10, 11 (2010)
(arguing that non-private foundations should use the PRI rules when making missionrelated investments because “the PRI rules offer useful guidance on how to structure
an investment by a public charity to ensure that the investment qualifies as a charitable
activity that will not be subject to UBIT or constitute private benefit that jeopardizes
the public charity’s tax-exempt status”).
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But there are potential legal impediments to a tranched
investment strategy other than the PRI rules. These impediments
apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations, not just private foundations, and
are conceptually more foundational than the specific PRI rules. The
focus on private foundations and PRI rules has resulted in a general
lack of treatment of the foundational issues associated with tranched
investments, and even when these legal issues are addressed, the
discussion is unnecessarily distracted by concerns that apply only to
private foundations and their specific rules.56 For that reason, this
Article addresses the non-PRI legal issues. In order to do so, it assumes
that the Earth Charity is a public charity rather than a private
foundation, and so none of the donors/investors in the Cookstove
Project are private foundations.
D. The Subsidy Problem
A reader is likely to have one of two instinctive responses to my
description of a tranched investment strategy—one positive and one
skeptical. Really one should have both reactions simultaneously. On
the one hand, a reader should be outraged. After all, a tranched
investment strategy means that a federally recognized tax-exempt
charity will provide funds to a for-profit business enterprise with the
expectation that it may not receive any of its money back.57 Even worse,
the charity fully understands that other private investors may receive a
return on their investment, even when the charity does not.
Furthermore, even if both the charitable investor and the private
investors receive a financial return on their investment, the private
investors will receive a higher rate of return than the charity.
Charitable donors presumably contributed the charity’s investment
and trusted the charity to observe its duty to use those funds to advance
the organization’s tax-exempt purpose.
Perhaps even more
importantly, the government granted tax benefits both to the donors
56

An excellent article addressing the private foundation rules in detail is Brewer,
supra note 11, at 715–19 (describing a “contract hybrid” structure that enables a
community grocery to access both equity capital from private investors and a belowmarket loan from two tax-exempt foundations). See also Archer, supra note 13, at 174–
75 (describing a three-tranche structure in which (i) a charitable foundation takes a
lowest-priority interest with a 1 percent return; (ii) a “socially responsible investor”
takes a middle tranche with a 3 percent return; and (iii) a “profit-sector investor”
makes a 50 percent capital investment with the lowest risk but with a “market
competitive six percent rate of return”).
57
In the private foundation context, investments that are too risky or that promise
too low returns may be subject to penalizing excise taxes under section 4944 of the
Code, unless those investments constitute “program related investments.” See I.R.C. §
4944(c). No comparable explicit penalty regime exists for public charities.
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of the charity (tax deductible contributions) and to the charity itself
(tax exemption on investment earnings) for the purpose of
encouraging the pursuit of the organization’s charitable purpose.58
Those tax benefits were not given to enrich private investors. A
tranched investment strategy appears to potentially create a situation
in which the charity is subsidizing the profits earned by the private
investors, and that seems deeply troubling.59 In this Article, the term
“subsidy problem” is used to refer to the concern that private investors
in a tranched investment strategy may be diverting charitable funds to
enhance their profits.60
On the other hand, one might think that the structure is not
troubling at all. After all, there is no reason why the traditional nonprofit sector should have a monopoly on producing social goods. The
idea that the business community should not address its peculiar
genius to the problems that face the world, and that one good way to
do that would be for it to partner with the non-profit sector, seems
completely plain. Whether such partnerships are called “bordercrossings”61 or “hybrids”62 or just “social enterprises,” some
commentators believe that these entities have the potential to increase
the social good.63 Furthermore, the idea that these hybrid social
enterprises would combine a subsidized investment by a charity with
investors who want a return financial return of some sort should not
be surprising.64 The best way to access large quantities of capital for
58

See, e.g., Galle, supra note 3, at 2042 (pointing out that tax-exemption creates a
higher return for charitable investors whose profits are free from federal tax).
59
In When the Law is Understood—L3C No (William Mitchell Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2010-07, 2010), Daniel S. Kleinberger and J. William Callison provide an
example of an “outraged” reaction:
Foundations have the privileges of tax-exempt status and the ability to
receive deductible contributions. Tranched investing runs the risk of
exporting these privileges to benefit non-charitable businesses,
managers, and investors. Tax law has a term for this sort of private
benefit—private inurement—and transactions that create private
inurement cause large and potentially debilitating problems for
charitable organizations. Properly constructed, a tranched investment
arrangement might well survive IRS scrutiny, but it is dangerous to
advocate tranched investing by foundations as a generic, easily designed,
and readily-available device for social progress.
See also Bishop, supra note 15, at 265; Callison & Vestal, supra note 15, at 292.
60
See supra note 15.
61
See Tahk, supra note 2, at 492.
62
See Reiser & Dean, supra note 15.
63
See, e.g., Tahk, supra note 2, at 494 (“[F]ederal tax law not only should accept
the reality that organizations cross sectorial borders, but should also consider how to
direct those crossings in ways that produce social benefit.”).
64
Among other things, governments often partner with the business community
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scaling a potentially expensive or capital-intensive project is to offer a
competitive financial return to providers of that capital.65
But whichever instinctive reaction a reader has, it is clear that a
tranched investment strategy has a potential dilemma at its heart. The
tranches are premised on the idea that some investors are willing to
take a lower return or greater risk in order to facilitate the social
benefit that the enterprise seeks to advance. They want to provide a
subsidy to further the enterprise’s social mission. But there is always
the potential for this subsidy to be diverted from the social mission and
used to enrich the market-rate investors. That is because there is no
obvious method for evaluating whether the market-rate investors are
receiving a market-rate return on their investment or an above-market
return. That is not to say that no measurement is possible.66 But it is
hard to imagine a one-size-fits-all measurement system that could
provide the basis for government regulation of the whole sector.
If one thinks there is at least some value in both reactions, then
one may want to explore a legal or regulatory regime that permits
tranched social enterprises but imposes some restrictions on how they
are structured. In fact, the federal tax code contains exactly such a
regulatory regime. The next section discusses the federal tax regime
that regulates tranched social enterprises, and explores whether it
strikes the proper balance between protecting donors and the
government against abusive misdirection of charitable contributions
(and the tax benefits that accompany them) and encouraging (or
refraining from discouraging) capital formation for socially beneficial
enterprises.
II. THE PRIVATE INUREMENT LEGAL REGIME
Tax laws regulate tranched investment structures for social
enterprises, but only if one of the investors is a recognized tax-exempt
organization. If the structure involves a tax-exempt organization (as
the Cookstove Project does), the solution to the “subsidy problem” has
at least two distinct components. First, tax-exempt philanthropic
investors are bound by the “private inurement doctrine” and certain
ancillary laws that support the private inurement doctrine such as the

to provide social goods by providing direct tax subsidies for certain activities, like the
provision of low-income housing, or by contracting directly with for-profit firms to
provide those goods.
65
See, e.g., Arthur Wood, New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35
VT. L. REV. 45 (2010).
66
See discussion infra note 100.
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penalties imposed by the Tax Code on “excess benefit transactions.”67
These laws apply generally to prevent the people who exert control
over a charitable organization from diverting its funds into their own
pockets. In this Article, I generally call this set of laws the “Private
Inurement Regime.”
Investors in social enterprises that are tax-exempt charitable
organizations are also bound by a second set of rules. These rules seek
to prevent a diversion of funds or energy away from the organization’s
charitable mission, but apply whether or not the potential beneficiaries
of the diversion are in a position to control the charity. This second
set of rules includes the so-called “private benefit doctrine” as well as
the IRS’s “joint venture rules,” which are derived from the private
benefit doctrine. I call this second set of laws and rules the “Private
Benefit Regime.”68 The essential difference between the two regimes
is that the Private Inurement Regime applies only when some person
who exerts control over a charitable entity obtains some private benefit
from that charity or its funds. Whereas the Private Benefit Regime
applies even when the person who obtains a private benefit from the
charity or its funds does not exert control over the charity.69
Note that the current legal regime applies only if the
philanthropic investor is an exempt organization.70 Thus, there is a
second very different legal regime that applies if none of the
philanthropic investors are tax-exempt organizations. If private
philanthropic investors want to make a below-market investment in a
tranched social enterprise, they are not subject to the private
inurement rules, the joint venture rules, or the special rules for private
foundations.71

67

See I.R.C. § 4958.
There is a third separate regime that applies only to so-called private
foundations, that includes the “program related investment” restrictions, among other
things.
69
Despite the fact that these regimes are fundamentally different, “These
doctrines are often incorrectly used interchangeably.” See Nicholas A. Mirkay,
Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on Exempt Organizations in
Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 29 (2006) (citing Distinguishing Between Private
Benefit and Inurement, TAX-EXEMPT ADVISOR (CCH), Dec. 11, 2000, at 9).
70
Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary
Problems, in JOSEPH J. CORDES & C. EUGENE STEURLE, NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 90 (2009)
(“Keep in mind, though, that the tax system’s benefits are limited and, because
favorable tax treatment is essentially elective, and organization may simply forego taxfavored status if it wishes to avoid the strings that come attached.”).
71
This is because application of federal law to charities only applies when those
charities seek tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(a).
68
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This section deals with the laws that apply when the investors in
the Subsidizing Tranche are charitable entities. Remember, legal
reformers have consistently stated that one prominent goal of social
entrepreneurs is to be able to access capital from both charitable
sources and regular capital markets,72 and so it is accordingly important
to deal extensively with the law that applies to such mixtures of capital.
A. Private Inurement
The first and most obvious legal solution to the subsidy problem
is the prohibition on “private inurement” that applies to exempt
organizations. Section 501(c)(3) of the Code mandates that “no part
of the net earnings of [a qualifying organization] inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual[.]”73 This provision is the basis
of the so-called “nondistribution constraint.”74 It is what distinguishes
non-profit organizations from for-profit organizations.75 And, it is this
prohibition that prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from directly
accessing capital from equity investors, since the IRS has held that a
501(c)(3) organization with shareholders who are entitled to a portion
of its profits is per se engaged in private inurement.76 This per se
inurement originates in the plain language of the statute, which
emphasizes “net earnings” flowing to “private shareholders.” Thus,
direct equity ownership of a 501(c)(3) organization is impossible
because of the private inurement doctrine.77
But, in addition to preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from
directly accessing equity capital, the private inurement prohibition
potentially affects investments by 501(c)(3) organizations in a venture
that itself has equity investors. That is because the most common
meaning of “private inurement” is much broader than the transfer of
72

See supra note 11.
See § 501(c)(3)(“[N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual.”).
74
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980).
75
See BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 505 (10th ed. 2011)
(“[I]ndeed, [the doctrine of private inurement] is the fundamental defining principle
of law that distinguishes nonprofit organizations from for-profit organizations.”) (emphasis
added).
76
Id. at 523 (“With the emphasis of the federal tax law, in the private inurement
area, on net earnings and the reference to private shareholders, the most literal and
obvious form of private inurement is the parceling out of an exempt organization’s
net income to those akin to shareholders.”).
77
This is true even if the equity ownership is in the form of so-called “participating
debt,” in which a debt-like instrument permits the lender to receive a return measured
by net income. See Brewer, supra note 11, at 696.
73
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net income directly to equity owners, since the “inurement prohibition
serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from siphoning off any
of a charity’s income or assets for personal use.”78 Thus, in general,
private inurement involves (1) one or more insiders79—people who are
in a position to control the charity—and (2) some excessive benefit
flowing to those people—something more than just reasonable
compensation for their provision of property or services to the
charity.80
If private inurement involves a 501(c)(3) organization “siphoning
off” funds to insiders, then a 501(c)(3) organization’s investment in a
social enterprise could constitute private inurement if one or more
insiders owned the social enterprise, and if the investment constituted
an excessive benefit. Several commentators have explained why the
private inurement rules (among others) prevent social enterprises
from operating as tax-exempt organizations,81 and some have
mentioned that the private inurement doctrine may be a problem for
tranched investing in social enterprises,82 but none have analyzed in
any depth how the rules impact such an investment.83

78

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (1991). See also John D. Colombo, In Search of
Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) (“The [private inurement] prohibition
refers to ‘siphoning off’ the income or assets of the exempt organization via non-arm’slength transactions with ‘insiders.’”) (internal citations omitted).
79
See, e.g., United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir.
1999) (“The term ‘any private shareholder or individual’ in the inurement clause of
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code has been interpreted to mean an
insider of the charity.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)–1(c)(1982) (defining “private
shareholder or individual” as “persons having a personal and private interest in the
activities of the organization”).
80
See, e.g., I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK (IRM 7751) § 342.1(3)
(“[T]he prohibition of inurement, in its simplest terms, means that a private
shareholder or individual cannot pocket the organization’s funds except as reasonable
payment for goods or services.”).
81
See Brewer, supra note 11, at 697–98 (briefly describing the law); Id. at 708
(“[T]he prohibitions on private inurement . . . prohibit tax-exempt status for an
organization that issues equity-like debt to insiders.”).
82
See, e.g., supra note 15; Bishop, supra note 15, at 264–65 (“[T]he trancheinvestment notion potentially violates the private inurement restriction” but “these
questions are yet unanswered, and general guidance is sought from related
authorities.”).
83
Brewer does not address any potential private inurement in his “contract
hybrid” tranched investment model because he assumes that the charitable tranche is
wholly independent from the market tranche, and so no “insiders” in the charity are
also investors in the social enterprise, negating the possibility of private inurement. See
Brewer, supra note 11, at 716–18. Archer likewise does not address the private
inurement rules because he also assumes that “[t]he private investors in the L3C’s
market tranche will normally be considered ‘outsiders’ because they lack direct
influence over the foundation’s affairs.” Archer, supra note 13, at 190.
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Because the private inurement doctrine demands not just an
excess benefit, but also an “insider,” it would only impact a hybrid
social enterprise if the investors in the Subsidized (market-level or
quasi-market-level) Tranche were related to insiders in the charitable
organization that made the subsidizing (below-market or purely
charitable) investment. For example, in the Cookstove Project, which
has a Subsidized Tranche of equity owners and a Subsidizing Tranche
comprised of the Earth Charity, private inurement could exist only if
the owners of the Subsidized Tranche (or their relatives) had some
sort of influence or control over the Earth Charity. If any of the
investors in the Subsidized Tranche were the founder of the Earth
Charity, or a board member, or the executive director, or the husband
of the executive director, or even potentially a substantial contributor
to it, there would be the possibility of private inurement. Private
inurement law, however, is relatively undefined, and it is not entirely
clear either what type of relationship constitutes influence or control
or what type of benefit constitutes inurement.
B. Excess Benefit Transactions
While the inurement doctrine is somewhat imprecise, it has been
bolstered and supplemented by more detailed statutory schemes that
arguably serve the same purpose: preventing insiders from enriching
themselves at the expense of the charity.84 The first more detailed
statutory scheme was enacted in 1969, and applied only to that
subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations called “private foundations.”85
In 1996 Congress supplemented the private foundation rules with a
statutory scheme that provides penalties for so-called “excess benefit
transactions” between insiders and all non-private-foundation
501(c)(3) organizations (generally called “public charities”).86 These
penalties are called “intermediate sanctions” because they are
intended to permit the government to sanction charities for
transactions that excessively benefit insiders without revoking the
organization’s tax-exempt status, which was formerly the IRS’s only
remedy under the private inurement doctrine.87 However, they cover
84

See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1068 (“Today, the private inurement limitation
largely has been supplanted by I.R.C. § 4958 . . . which provides statutory remedies
short of loss of tax exemption for these siphoning transactions.”).
85
See I.R.C. § 4941. In 1969, Congress enacted a statutory regime to punish Private
Foundations and their leadership if they engaged in “self-dealing” transactions. Id. A
self-dealing transaction is a transaction between a Foundation and a disqualified
person. Id.
86
See id. at § 4958.
87
Hopkins, supra note 75, at 548.
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essentially the same ground as the inurement rule: situations in which
the charity enriches certain insiders by providing them an excessive
financial benefit.
The strength of the excess benefit transactions rules is that they
attempt to provide more precision and detail to the law of private
inurement, even though significant ambiguity remains. For example,
the statute defines the type of relationship at issue (a “disqualified
person”) as anyone who was or is “in a position to exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization.”88 It defines the “excess
benefit” as one in which “the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of
services) received for providing such benefit.”89 All of the law of excess
benefit transactions flows from these two deceptively simple
formulations.
One starts the analysis only if there is some benefit, since there
can be no excess benefit transaction without a benefit. In the case of
the Cookstove Project, investors in the Subsidized Tranche are
providing capital in exchange for the right to a portion of the profits
of the venture. Receiving a payment in exchange for the provision of
start-up capital is exactly the kind of benefit that warrants excess
benefit transaction analysis. But, remember, the Cookstove Project
itself is not a tax-exempt organization. Federal tax law does not
prevent insiders in the Cookstove Project from benefitting financially
from its operations, even if those benefits are “excessive.”90 Rather, it
is the Earth Charity—the investor in the Subsidizing Tranche—that is
subject to the rules, and so it is the Earth Charity that we must focus
on in our analysis. The Earth Charity is providing a benefit to the
Cookstove Project in the form of start-up capital, and so there is an
obvious benefit flowing from the Earth Charity to the Cookstove
Project.
Once we determine that there is a benefit, we must determine if
it is flowing to any disqualified persons. If there are no disqualified
persons, there is no application of the excess benefit transaction rules.
There are two ways to analyze the question of whether there are any
disqualified persons. First, since the Cookstove Project is itself a legal
88

§ 4958(f)(1)(A). The term “disqualified person” also includes a family member
of a person who exercises substantial control, an entity controlled by a person who
exercises substantial control, and a few other miscellaneous categories of person. See
§ 4958(f)(1)(B)–(F).
89
Id. at § 4958(c)(1)(A).
90
If the insiders are directors, state fiduciary duty law might prevent such excessive
benefits. Similarly, state corporation laws prevent corporate waste, which may extend
to excessive payments to insiders under certain circumstances.
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entity, it is a “person” who could be a “disqualified person.” The statute
defines disqualified person to include “a 35-percent controlled
entity,”91 which it defines as a corporation, partnership or trust in
which disqualified persons control more than 35 percent of the voting
power, profits interest, or beneficial interest respectively.92 Thus, if 35
percent or more of the Cookstove Project is controlled by disqualified
persons, then the Cookstove Project itself is a disqualified person.
Thus, we need to determine which individuals are disqualified persons
with respect to the Earth Charity in order to determine whether the
Cookstove Project itself is a disqualified person with respect to the
Earth Charity.
In addition to the statute, regulations provide detail about what
kind of individuals qualify as disqualified persons, and, unsurprisingly,
the types of persons in this category are generally the same people
identified in the private inurement context: voting members of the
charity’s governing body, senior officers of the charity and family
members of disqualified persons.93 Further, the regulations specify
that certain people might be disqualified persons, depending on an
analysis of all the facts and circumstances. These people include the
founder of the charity, substantial contributors to the charity, and
people who control a discrete aspect of the charity.94 So, if directors,
senior officers, founders, or senior employees of the Earth Charity, or
a family member of any of those people, own 35 percent of the
Cookstove Project, then the Cookstove Project may well be a
disqualified person. Remember, disqualified persons are determined
based on their relationship to the Earth Charity, not to the Cookstove
Project. If the owners of 35 percent or more of the Cookstove Project
are disqualified persons with respect to the Earth Charity, then the
Cookstove Project is itself a disqualified person. But relationships with
the Cookstrove Project other than ownership (like management or
other indices of influence) do not make the Cookstove Project itself a

91

Id. at § 4958(f)(1)(C).
Id. at § 4958(f)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(2002).
93
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c)(2002) (including persons serving the function of
president, C.E.O., C.O.O., treasurer and C.F.O. “regardless of title”).
94
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e) (2002). The examples in the Regulations suggest
that in the hospital context, the question of whether a doctor is a “department head”
may be the factor that determines whether she is a disqualified person or not. Compare
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), ex. 10 (doctor who is not a department head is not a
disqualified person) with Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), ex. 11 (doctor who is a
department head is a disqualified person). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-36020
(Sept. 6, 2013) (finding that a doctor who is not a department head is not a
disqualified person).
92
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disqualified person.95 There is a potential excess benefit transaction
issue if the entrepreneur or others are disqualified persons with
respect to the Earth Charity—by being directors or officers of the Earth
Charity—and own at least 35 percent of the Cookstove Project.
Finally, even if the Earth Charity provided a financial benefit to
the Cookstove Project (in the form of an equity investment) and the
Cookstove Project was a disqualified person, there is still no excess
benefit transaction unless the benefit received is excessive.96 Section
501(c)(3) organizations provide benefits to disqualified persons all the
time with no implication of impropriety, much less illegality. For
example, 501(c)(3) organizations may pay compensation to employees
who perform services for the organization.97 They may also pay interest
to persons who provide capital to the organization in the form of debt.
These payments are not problematic because the value of the capital
or services provided is equal to the value of the compensation paid by
the charity and so the benefit is not “excess.” A benefit is only excess
if a disqualified person receives more in a transaction with the
501(c)(3) organization than he could have obtained in a market
transaction between unrelated persons. For example, if a person gets
paid more salary than he should be paid, that could be an excess
benefit transaction; if a person loans money to the 501(c)(3)
organization and gets paid an above-market interest rate, that could be
an excess benefit transaction; if a person borrows money from the
organization and pays a below-market interest rate, that could be an
excess benefit transaction; and if a charity sells its operation to a
disqualified person for less than it is worth, that could be an excess
benefit transaction.98
In the case of the Cookstove Project, the Earth Charity provided
capital in the form of a below-market equity investment. The fact that
the investment is “below market” seems to provide evidence that the
Cookstove Project received a benefit (start-up capital) that “exceeds
the value of the consideration” (below-market dividends or profits)
95

There is some potential confusion in this issue. As discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 113 and 114, both the IRS and some commentators have taken
the position that control of a subsidiary or joint venture could render a person a
disqualified person with respect to a charity that is a member of the joint venture, even
if the alleged disqualified person exerted no influence directly over the charity. For
reasons discussed infra, this approach is overly inclusive.
96
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A)(“[I]f the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration . . . received for providing such benefit . . .”).
97
See, e.g., World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 969 (1983) (“[T]he law
places no duty on individuals operating charitable organizations to donate their
services; they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts.”).
98
Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002), rev’d 456 F. 3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006).

LEFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/15/2015 5:06 PM

PREVENTING PRIVATE INUREMENT

31

paid to it for that benefit.99 Thus, with respect to the Cookstove Project
as an entity, it appears that the transaction is an excess benefit
transaction. If the Cookstove Project as an entity is a disqualified
person, the provision of a below-market investment tranche appears to
be an excess-benefit transaction, and penalties would presumably
apply. Remember, the Cookstove Project is a disqualified person if it
is a “35-percent controlled entity,” which means that disqualified
persons own at least 35 percent of the entity. That seems like a pretty
straightforward prohibition on permitting individuals who control the
Earth Charity from owning more than 35 percent of the Cookstove
Project.
Even if the Cookstove Project itself is not a disqualified person
because disqualified persons do not own 35 percent of the Cookstove
Project, it is possible that there is an excess benefit transaction if any of
the investors in the Cookstove Project are disqualified persons with
respect to the Earth Charity. That is because when the Earth Charity
provides funds to the Cookstove Project, those funds in effect belong
to the investors in the Subsidized Tranche, or at least accrue to their
benefit. Thus, the provision of start-up capital to the Cookstove Project
is potentially a benefit to the investors in the Subsidized Tranche of
the Cookstove Project in addition to being a financial benefit to the
Cookstove Project itself.
But, just because a benefit flows to the Cookstove Project does not
necessarily mean that the benefit flows through to the investors in the
subsidized tranche. Remember, the purpose of the subsidy is to enable
the Cookstove Project to provide a social good-health for poor people
and lower greenhouse gas emissions for the environment. If the
subsidy provided by the Earth Charity is somehow “used up” by the
social good provided, then there is a plausible case to be made that the
benefit flowing to the Subsidized Tranche investors is not excessive at
all. It is just a regular market-rate return on their capital. In fact, this
premise is the basis of the whole structure. A charity provides a benefit
to a social enterprise to permit it to do good. The return paid to its
99

There is no IRS guidance specifically about charitable investments in the
subsidizing tranche of a social enterprise, but there is a fact mentioned in a recent
ruling addressing so-called “ancillary joint ventures” (discussed infra in section IV(B))
that pertains to the discussion here. In Revenue Ruling 2004-51, the IRS ruled that an
ancillary joint venture will not negatively impact a participating charity’s tax-exempt
status, so long as “[the partners’] ownership interests . . . are proportional to their
respective capital contributions, and all returns of capital, allocations and distributions
by [the partnership] are proportional to [the partners’] ownership interests.” Rev.
Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. Thus, in the case of a tranched investment strategy, in
which the ownership interests are not proportional, it is not clear what the IRS would
conclude.
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for-profit investors is not “above market;” it is no more than “at market”
in the sense that it is comparable to what those investors could receive
in comparable investments if some of the risk associated with the social
return were removed. On the other hand, it is not clear how one could
measure whether the subsidy is “used up” or not, at least not if you are
the IRS trying to administer a regulatory regime consistently.100
If it was too difficult to measure whether the benefit is “used up,”
one could try to measure directly whether the return provided to
market-rate investors is excessive. In order to do that, one would have
to determine what an unsubsidized market-rate return would be.101 But
measuring an unsubsidized return is very difficult or impossible.
Remember, a market return is some combination of projected return
and risk. If one’s return on investment is a share of the profits of the
venture, one cannot know what a “market” return would be unless one
knows what other options were available in the market, what his
projected returns looked like, and what his projected risk was. As any
business appraiser will tell you, these things defy full measurement.102
And, of course, the fact that the returns were subsidized by the charitable
tranche’s investment seems like at least preliminary evidence that the
100

When private foundations make grants to for-profit enterprises, they are subject
to an information collecting regime called “expenditure responsibility,” which is one
attempt to determine if a benefit provided by a tax-exempt entity is “used up” or not.
See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (1969). Unfortunately, the expenditure responsibility regime
is difficult to adapt to a tranched investment context, since it requires even in the
program-related investment context that the grant recipient “use all the funds received
from the private foundation . . . only for the purposes of the investment.” Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4945-5(b)(4)(i) (1972). This requirement that all funds provided under an
equity-type investment be “used up” creates significant legal uncertainty, since there is
no method that has been clearly accepted by the IRS for doing so. For a general
discussion of the difficulties involved in measuring social benefit. see Linda M.
Lampkin & Harry P. Hatry, Measuring the Nonprofit Bottom Line, in JOSEPH J. CORDES &
C. EUGENE STEURLE, NONPROFITS AND BUSINESS ch. 9 (2009).
101
The excess benefit transaction rules provide a mechanism by which a taxpayer
who follows a series of procedural steps can create a rebuttable presumption that the
benefit it is providing is not “excessive.” See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002). However,
one of the conditions necessary to create the presumption is that “the authorized body
obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its
determination [of how much to pay for the benefit].” Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(2)
(2002). But this presumption fits very uneasily with a situation in which a charity is
making an equity investment in a social venture. It is generally used to ensure that
compensation paid to executives is not excessive, and while it also applies to transfers
of funds in exchange for property or the use of property, it is difficult (although not
impossible) to analogize a transfer of capital in exchange for an interest in future
profits of a firm for a transfer of money in exchange for a property interest. In any
case, it seems unlikely for the reasons discussed in the text that comparability data
would be readily available.
102
See generally DAVID LARO & SHANNON P. PRATT, BUSINESS VALUATION AND FEDERAL
TAXES: PROCEDURE, LAW AND PERSPECTIVE 172–76 (2nd ed. 2011).
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returns provided to the market-rate investors are above market rate.103
The challenge in measuring return is exacerbated because we
chose for our hypothetical a return that is “equity-like” as opposed to
“debt-like.” In general, a debt-like return is one in which an investor
receives a return that is a fixed percentage of her capital contribution.
So, for example, in exchange for $100,000, an investor may receive a
right to the return of that $100,000 plus a fixed 5 percent per year until
the principal is repaid. In contrast, an equity-like investment is not
fixed with regard to the amount invested, but varies depending on the
profitability of the venture. So, for example, in exchange for an
investment of $100,000, an investor may receive a right to one percent
of the profits of the venture. Most detailed discussions of tranched
investment structures assume that the charity’s Subsidizing Tranche
would be debt-like.104 This may be partially because it seems easier to
measure whether a debt-like instrument is “below market” or not
because the availability of information about the credit market gives
the illusion that it is easy to find a “market” interest rate. Whereas an
appropriate equity-like return is a challenge to even conceive. It is
important, however, to note that the challenges associated with
identifying a “market” return in an equity-like instrument infect debtlike instruments as well. In both cases, a market return is a function of
risk, and a comparable rate cannot be identified without an accurate
assessment of risk in the venture at issue.105 Obviously, assessing risk in
a venture is an imprecise science (to say the least).106

103

It is worth pointing out that the Code expressly provides:
[T]o the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the
term ‘excess benefit transaction’ includes any transaction in which the
amount of any economic benefit provided to or for the use of a
disqualified person is determined in whole or in part by the revenues of
1 or more activities of the organization . . .
I.R.C. § 4948(c)(4) (1978). That provision presumably exists for the same reason that
paying a share of the profits of a tax-exempt organization is per se private inurement,
as discussed supra at note 76. Whether this provision could apply to the proposed
Cookstove Project’s structure would depend on whether the Cookstove Project could
be considered an “activit[y] of the organization.” But, in any case, since the Secretary
has so far refrained from promulgating any regulations pertaining to the provision, it
currently has no effect. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(2002) [Reserved].
104
See supra note 45.
105
See, e.g., Lowry Hospital Ass’n v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 850 (1976) (holding that loans
from a tax-exempt organization were “below-market” even though they were “roughly
equivalent to the interest rate it was receiving . . . on passbook deposits from the local
bank” because the loans “represented substantially greater risk”).
106
See Laro & Pratt, supra note 102.
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At bottom it seems that the best we can do is acknowledge that a
compelling case could be made that a subsidizing investment from the
Earth Charity to the Cookstove Project creates an excess benefit
transaction, and that evidence showing that the benefit was not
excessive would be hard to find or develop. The case is strongest if the
Cookstove Project is a disqualified person on account of 35 percent of
its shareholders being disqualified persons. The case is weaker, but
not by any means insignificant, if the Cookstove Project itself avoids
being a disqualified person itself, but disqualified persons are
nonetheless investors in the subsidized tranche. In that case there is
some risk at least that the IRS will successfully argue that an excess
benefit flows to such disqualified person investors, especially if no
compelling method is devised to show that the subsidy is “used up” for
the social purpose of the Project. Perhaps the most we can say is that
there is a significant risk that the IRS will interpret the excess benefit
rules to mean that the fact that the Earth Charity is providing a
subsidizing investment in itself constitutes an excess benefit flowing to
investors in the Subsidized Tranche. The fact that an argument could
be made that the benefit is not excessive, while plausible, does not
remove that risk.
Thus, the excess-benefit transaction rules
presumably significantly inhibit investment in the Subsidized Tranche
by disqualified persons.107
On the other hand, if no disqualified person is an investor in the
subsidized tranche, the organization should be able to rely on its own
internal assessment that the subsidizing tranche advances its charitable
purpose.108 It should not be overly chilled by a concern that the IRS
will disagree with it about the social value of the social enterprise.
Remember, the central premise of the entire charitable sector is the
idea that the non-distribution constraint is the primary check on
misdirection of funds by charities.109 This central premise should not
107

It is very hard to quantify how much in the way of potential investments are
being inhibited by uncertainty in the law, but the penalties can get very large. For
example, in Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002), rev’d, 456 F. 3d 444 (5th Cir.
2006), the total liability arising out of the imposition of excise taxes on the directors
of a relatively small tax-exempt nursing home amounted to $69,702,390.
108
See Archer, supra note 13, at 191 (“To avoid violating the inurement restriction,
a foundation must only ensure that no individuals with personal or professional ties to
the foundation take part in the market tranche of the L3C.”).
109
In The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations 40 (Yale Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 485, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379012, Ofer Eldar writes:
[C]ontrary to some recent claims that the non-distribution constraint
has lost its force as a commitment device because for-profits are
increasingly engaged in the pursuit of social goals, it remains a key
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be ignored when non-profits invest in tranched social enterprises. So
long as the charities and the profit-makers are independent, the nondistribution constraint should still have force to prevent a diversion of
funds away from social goals.
III. REFORMING THE PRIVATE INUREMENT REGIME
Some social enterprise legal reformers have asserted that private
inurement would be a significant problem for hybrid social enterprises
without analyzing why;110 at least one other has dismissed the private
inurement doctrine as inapplicable because he assumed that “[t]he
private investors in the L3C’s market tranche will normally be
considered ‘outsiders’ because they lack direct influence over the
foundation’s affairs.”111 Whether they will normally be considered
outsiders or not, it is at least clear that a tranched investment structure
in which they are not outsiders will be potentially problematic under
current law. It is probably fair to say that under current law any charity
making a subsidizing investment in a social enterprise should assure
itself that none of the investors in the subsidized tranche are
disqualified persons with respect to it.112
But there is significant ambiguity under current law about the
scope of the private inurement regime. On the one hand, there are
hints in IRS guidance that the IRS believes that a person can be a
disqualified person with respect to a charity solely because of her
control over an entity that seeks to advance that charity’s tax exempt
purpose,113 and at least one commentator thinks the IRS should
component of the commitment devices associated with for-profit social
enterprises. The assumption is that organizations which are subject to a
non-distribution constraint can be trusted to monitor for-profits.
110
See Bishop, supra note 15, at 265–67; Daniel Kleinberger, supra note 15, at 893.
111
Archer, supra note 13, at 190.
112
This position is by no means a consensus among lawyers who advise tranched
social enterprises or other joint ventures between charities and for-profit entities. As
Ellen Aprill has commented (in the private foundation context), “private practitioners
tell me that there is confusion about indirect self-dealing, that the regulations
regarding indirect self-dealing add to the confusion, and that one area of particular
uncertainty is joint investment by disqualified persons and private foundations in
various investment vehicles.” See Aprill, supra note 17, at 20.
113
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), ex. 7 (2002) (stating that a management
company that manages a hospital that is the subject of a whole hospital joint venture
between a charity and a for-profit entity “is a disqualified person with respect to [the
charity]” even if the management company is otherwise wholly unrelated to the charity
solely because the management company has “ultimate responsibility for supervising
the management of the hospital”). But note that this example, by its terms, applies
only to a whole venture joint venture in the hospital context, and is therefore
ambiguous about whether the same analysis applies in an ancillary joint venture
context or in an investment, loan, or grant that does not constitute a joint venture.
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embrace this expansive reading of the private inurement regime.114 In
other words, the director of the Cookstove Project could be a
disqualified person with respect to the Earth Charity because she
controls the Cookstove Project, even if she is completely unconnected
to the Earth Charity. This expansive reading of the private inurement
regime would dramatically increase the scope of the doctrine beyond
merely preventing charitable insiders from benefiting from the
charity’s subsidizing investments.
On the other hand, there is also ambiguity about whether an
equity interest in the Cookstove Project necessarily constitutes an
“excess benefit” with respect to the Earth Charity when the Earth
Charity makes a subsidizing investment in the Cookstove Project. If
the Earth Charity could show that a subsidizing equity investment does
not result in an above-market return for the market-tranche
investors—for example, by showing that the “subsidy” is entirely “used
up”—then there is no private inurement. The question of whether the
benefit flowing to the market-tranche investors is an “excess benefit”
or not is equally pronounced if the Subsidizing Tranche is a belowmarket loan or a grant.
I propose that the IRS issue guidance that makes clear what seems
like simple good advice under current law: that the existence of a
Subsidizing Tranche in a tranched social enterprise creates the
presumption that the subsidized tranche is receiving an excess benefit.
Therefore, the private inurement regime requires that any charity
providing funds to the subsidizing tranche must be independent from
the Subsidized Tranche. In other words, the subsidized tranche
cannot contain any investors who are disqualified persons with respect
to any charitable investor in the subsidizing tranche. But it should also
make clear that a person who is completely independent of all
charitable investors does not become a disqualified person merely
because of her involvement with, or control over, the social enterprise.
In other words, just because the charity is investing in a social
enterprise does not mean that all the persons who control the social
enterprise are disqualified persons with respect to the charity.
114

Nicholas Mirkay characterizes IRS guidance as expressing “a long-held view . . .
that a person or entity can become a disqualified person by entering into a contractual
arrangement with an exempt organization if the contract provides such person or
entity with the ability to control a portion of the exempt organization’s income with
no effective limitations or restrictions on possible private inurement.” Mirkay, supra
note 69, at 77–78. He argues that this expansive reading of the private inurement
doctrine under certain circumstances would permit the IRS to police transactions
between charities and for-profit partners when they engage in ventures together,
whether they are social enterprises or not. See id. at 71–84.
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Under this proposed guidance, there would be no problem with
a social entrepreneur creating the Cookstove Project to help poor
people, slow global warming, and make money. She could be an
investor in the market tranche receiving a market return on her
investment. She could find a charity or charities, like the Earth
Charity, to invest at a lower return (or higher risk) in a subsidizing
tranche of the project, so long as she was not a disqualified person with
respect to this charity or charities. She could not be its founder, the
sister of its president, a member of the board of directors, or a major
contributor. But as long as she met this simple requirement, she would
be free to profit from the Cookstove Project. This principle would
apply not only to the entrepreneur investing in the market tranche,
but also to her compensation. As long as she was not a disqualified
person with respect to the Earth Charity, she could be paid a share of
the profits of the enterprise for her services.
This may seem like simple good advice, but it has at least two
significant implications. First, it means that an entrepreneur who
wishes to invest in the social enterprise cannot also control any charity
that invests in the charitable tranche.115 Much of the literature on
social enterprises has assumed that a founder or entrepreneur will own
an equity interest in the project,116 and so it is likely that the private
inurement legal regime prevents social enterprise entrepreneurs from
controlling the charities that fund their ventures.117 In other words,
social entrepreneurs seeking charitable investments must find
“independent” charities interested in funding them. But it also means
that tranched social enterprises can be used to provide a profit-related
financial return to project managers or entrepreneurs. This responds
to a rising tide of criticism of the effect of tax-exempt organizations law
on incentives in the non-profit sector.118

115

This limitation may constrain some “philanthrocapitalists” who wish to exercise
“muscular philanthropy” in which the charitable funder exercises significant control
over the social enterprise. See Jenkins, supra note 34. But it is only a limitation if
disqualified person with respect to the charity also want to be investors.
116
See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11, at 708.
117
See Tahk, supra note 2, at 517 (“Additionally, with the contract hybrid structure,
the individuals controlling the exempt entity may not benefit financially from the forprofit business . . . . Correspondingly, investors in the for-profit need to be comfortable
pursuing a shared mission with an exempt organization they do not control.”).
118
See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L.
REV. 2017, 2065 (2007); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy
and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009) (“[T]he government
should eliminate tax discrimination between producers of altruism.”).

LEFF(DO NOT DELETE)

38

1/15/2015 5:06 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1

This section argues that this proposal is not only expedient as a
simplification of existing law, but is theoretically justified.
A. Evaluating a Strengthened Private Inurement Regime
If the private inurement regime could provide clear boundaries
within which tranched social enterprises could operate, one still must
evaluate whether those restrictions are beneficial or detrimental.
There is a compelling argument that the private inurement regime is
at the heart of all regulation of charitable non-profits, and so an
evaluation of the value of clear enforcement of the private inurement
regime in the social enterprise context is really an evaluation of
whether there is value in importing the law of charities into the law of
social enterprises, at least under certain circumstances. Remember,
this importation of the law of charities into the law of social enterprises
occurs only when a social enterprise seeks capital from charitable
sources. It is not triggered when a social enterprise seeks capital from
non-charitable sources, even if those sources seek a social return and
are willing to invest in a subsidizing tranche. Thus, an evaluation of
whether the private inurement regime is beneficial or not is a question
of whether (1) it is beneficial to impose the private inurement regime
on funds that have been donated to charity in a context in which the
donor received a tax deduction for the donation (and the charity
received a tax exemption for profits made from the investment of
those funds), and (2) whether it is beneficial to be able to donate to,
or invest in, social enterprises that are bound by a no-inurement
requirement. I argue that both things are beneficial.
The question of whether the private inurement regime is
beneficial is in some ways the same as the question of whether it is
beneficial to require that charitable entities be non-profits. As
discussed above, the private inurement regime is just another word for
the requirement that a charity be a non-profit: it is what distinguishes
a non-profit organization from a for-profit one.119 As many others and I
have noted, the dominant argument for why “non-profitness” is
beneficial—and therefore why it is valuable for the government to
enforce the inurement regime—has been Henry Hansmann’s theory
of “contract failure.”120

119

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 845
(1980); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
506 (1981).
120
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This theory, which is sometimes called the “agency theory,”121
argues that the non-distribution constraint facilitates transactions in
which a “patron” seeks to give a producer money in exchange for the
production of some good under circumstances in which it is very
expensive (or impossible) for the patron to monitor the quality of the
good.122 The quintessential example of such a situation is when the
patron seeks to provide money that will be used to provide a good that
benefits a person whom the patron does not know and will never meet,
such as when a wealthy donor gives money to a charity to benefit the
poor in a far-away land.123 In that circumstance, the donor has very
little information about whether the charity provided a high-quality
benefit, or if the benefit was even provided at all. Because it would be
so expensive for the donor to get evidence of the quality of the good
provided to the poor, there is an incentive—absent any legal
intervention—for the provider of the benefit to skimp on quality and
put any savings in his pocket.124
The government therefore intervenes to provide some certainty
to the donor that such expropriation is not occurring. But it is very
difficult or impossible for the government (or anyone else) to certify
the quality of the goods provided directly, since measurement of social
goods are so variable. So, a substitution is performed. Rather than
monitoring and enforcing a certain quality of goods, the nondistribution constraint monitors and enforces the financial benefits
going from the charity to insiders in the charity, on the theory that so
long as no excessive benefits are flowing from the charity to the people
who control it, the patron/donor can be relatively assured that those
benefits are being used in good faith to provide the social goods
intended by the donor at as high a quality as possible.125 In other words,
the presumption at the core of the non-distribution constraint is that
121

See Leff, supra note 32, at 823 (explaining why the term “agency theory” is
possibly not the best term to use, but that it has become accepted).
122
See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980)
123
See id.
124
As Brian Galle points out, “Since Hansmann first wrote in the early 1980s,
scholars have penned a considerable new literature on the exchange of ‘credence’
goods, or goods whose quality must largely be taken on faith by the purchaser, ranging
from legal services to organic foods.” See Galle, supra note 3, at 2036.
125
But, of course, even when non-profit directors are acting in good faith, they may
well make decisions that are inefficient. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without
Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Form, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 464 (1996) (“[W]hile the nondistribution constraint might
convince the patron that the nonprofit is more trustworthy than a for-profit in
situations of opportunistic behavior, the nonprofit could be even less trustworthy in
avoiding inefficient expenditures.”).
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the best way to ensure that benefits are being provided as efficiently as
possible is to constrain the ability of insiders to enrich themselves by
skimping on the benefits provided or diverting funds away from
charitable benefits toward themselves.126
The existence of non-profit firms is made possible by the
government’s willingness to enforce the non-distribution constraint in
situations in which patrons/donors and producers agree that the nondistribution constraint is the most efficient legal regime to govern their
transaction. But this standard explanation does not explain why tax
benefits—like charitable contribution deduction and exemption from
corporate tax—should be available only to non-profit firms. Some
social enterprise advocates (though not by any means most) have
identified this apparent unfairness as a justification for extending tax
benefits to social enterprises that are not constrained by the nondistribution constraint.127 Where a government subsidy is provided to
a charitable enterprise, however, the government’s interest in
advancing the social purpose that the subsidy seeks to advance justifies
limiting the tax benefit to firms that are subject to the non-distribution
constraint.128 Several commentators argue that tax benefits should be
available only to non-profit firms precisely because it is so difficult for
the government to measure social benefit.129
But even if the private inurement regime is justified in the
charitable context, the question remains under which circumstances
there is a justification for importing it into the social enterprise
context. The first answer is that there is a justification for importing

126

This “best” is of course relative, since the non-distribution constraint is only the
most efficient means because the quality of the goods provided cannot efficiently be
observed, either by the patron or by the government. In most non-charitable
situations, we assume that a patron can observe the quality of goods, and that in those
cases it is more efficient to permit the provider of goods to enrich herself by reducing
costs. In fact, in most firms we assume that the key to efficient provision of goods
comes from a combination of competition and the ability of providers to enrich
themselves by increasing efficiency.
127
Malani & Posner, supra note 118, at 2065 (arguing that tax benefits should be
available to for-profit firms if they operate for “charitable” purposes); Henderson &
Malani, supra note 118, at 607 (“[T]he government should eliminate tax
discrimination between producers of altruism.”); DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW
RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL (2008).
128
See Leff, supra note 32, at 854–68.
129
See, e.g., James Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz &Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2010) (“[A]s a realistic
matter, it is almost impossible to administer a system that ties tax benefits to public
benefit provision levels.”); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 391 (finding that hybrids
should not have tax benefits because of “four reasons, each of which arises from the
difficulty of defining and policing ‘public benefit’”).
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the private inurement regime into the social enterprise context when
a charity is passing on its charitable tax benefits by making a grant to,
or making a subsidizing investment in, a social enterprise. For
example, when the Earth Charity makes a subsidizing investment in
the Cookstove Project, the Earth Charity’s tax benefits are in effect
transferred to the Cookstove Project. If insiders of the Earth Charity
were able to divert those tax benefits to themselves on account of their
control over the Earth Charity and their investor status in the
Cookstove Project, then we might worry that the government’s tax
benefits were being abused. Because the Cookstove Project (and its
donors) received a tax benefit from the government (in the form of
deductible contributions and exemption of income), the government
has an interest in preventing those funds from being diverted from
their social purposes to the financial benefit of the very people tasked
with protecting the social mission of those funds. Once the
government has provided a tax benefit to encourage or facilitate some
charitable purpose, it is reasonable for it to require that benefit to be
used subject to the inurement regime. As I discuss in greater detail
elsewhere,130 the inurement regime may be the most efficient way for
the government to ensure that its investment in social benefits be used
for those benefits. When the private inurement rule is applied to
prohibit people who control the Earth Charity from profiting from the
Cookstove Project, this independence of the Earth Charity’s directors
and managers removes any direct financial incentives to divert the
Cookstove Project from its social purposes to its financial profitability.
In addition, once their ability to profit financially from the Cookstove
Project is removed, their independence reduces the likelihood that the
Subsidizing Tranche will excessively subsidize the Subsidized Tranche,
since their only remaining incentive is for the Cookstove Project to
succeed in its social mission. The alignment of their interests with the
social mission of the organization directly benefits the government by
preventing a diversion of the tax benefits provided by it.
In addition, in situations in which a charity is making its
investment with charitable funds, the inurement requirement serves to
protect not just the government, but also a second class of interested
persons. In addition to protecting the government (or the taxpayer,
which is essentially the same thing), the inurement regime also
protects people who donated to the Earth Charity. Whether they made
their donation with knowledge of the Cookstove Project or not, they
donated with the understanding that the Earth Charity was bound by

130

See supra note 128
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the non-distribution rule, and so a diversion of charitable assets into
the pockets of the directors of the Cookstove Project would be a breach
of their reasonable expectations. In other words, the existence of the
inurement regime creates reasonable expectations among those
persons who choose to donate to charities. They chose tax-exempt
non-profits on the promise by the government that it would police the
non-distribution constraint with the private inurement regime, and
their choice of entity is “efficient” only if that expectation is respected.
Those people presumably made a calculation that providing funds in
that way was the most efficient way to provide the social benefit they
wished to support, and it would be a betrayal of those reasonable
expectations for the government to refrain from enforcing the
inurement rule on investments made with those donated charitable
funds.
Where no charitable funds are involved, the case for enforcing
the inurement regime is much weaker. Many social enterprises do not
involve charitable funds, and indeed under current law the inurement
regime does not apply to those organizations.131 Therefore, if no
charitable funds are needed, a social enterprise can avoid the
inurement regime, and no independent (non-investor) party is
necessary to the structure. But even in cases in which a social
enterprise does not need the tax benefits provided to charities, if the
private inurement regime provided clear rules about diversions of
funds, there might be a benefit for social enterprises to subject
themselves to it.
Social enterprises may seek to constrain themselves under a
clarified and strengthened private inurement regime because of the
regulatory goal of social enterprise legal reformers. Social enterprise
legal reformers seek to free social enterprises from the restrictions
contained in current law, but they also seek a credible means to
communicate to their various stakeholders that they are genuinely
valuing social goals.132 If the private inurement regime was clarified,
131

For example, a benefit corporation is a for-profit entity with no expectations
that it will be affiliated in any way with a charitable non-profit. Therefore, the private
inurement regime does not apply to it. See supra note 71. Ofer Eldar points out that
all the organizations that meet his somewhat narrower definition of what constitutes a
social enterprise use nonprofit organizations to monitor the commitment devices used
by the social enterprises. See Eldar, supra note 1, at 41 (“The essence of commitment
devices is that a nonprofit is responsible for identifying a class of patronbeneficiaries . . . and verifying the transactions with them.”).
132
See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 40, at 619 (“[The hybrid form] must . . . offer credible
commitments to enforce such enterprise’s dual missions.”); Reiser & Dean, supra note
15 at 1524 (“Social investors need assurance that their willingness to sacrifice financial
returns will not merely provide a windfall to entrepreneurs.”).
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and it was clear that it required that an independent charity to assess the
social impact of a social enterprise’s social purposes—and nothing
more—then stakeholders, including other social investors, could rely
on this independent assessment in making their own investment
decisions.
In other words, if the private inurement regime was clarified, noncharitable investors in the Cookstove Project might benefit from the
imposition of the private inurement regime as much or more than the
Earth Charity was benefiting from it. Imagine you are a private person
who wishes to invest non-charitable dollars in a social enterprise, but
you care about the social mission as well as the financial mission of the
enterprise. If there is a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds, and a
subsidized tranche of market-rate investors, you fall potentially
between the two. You wish to be a subsidizing investor, but you are not
operating with charitable funds; you have not received any tax benefit
in the form of a deduction for a donation or tax-free income.
Now imagine that you have the choice of investing in a social
enterprise that has a true charitable tranche (like the Cookstove
Project) or a social enterprise that has no true charitable tranche (let’s
call it the Cheap Stove Project). Imagine that you are looking at a
website that enables individuals to make below-market investments in
social enterprises, a crowd-source website like Kickstarter (which
accepts donations) or Crowdfunder (which accepts investments),133
and you are trying to decide whether to invest in the Cheap Stove
Project or the Cookstove Project. The Cookstove Project now has three
tranches: the subsidizing charitable tranche, the subsidized marketrate tranche and a second subsidizing tranche made up of sociallyminded individual investors like you. The Cheap Stove Project is also
a social enterprise, but it seeks to raise funds from two sources: a
tranche of market-rate investors and a tranche of subsidizing
individuals (not charities). Because the Cheap Stove Project has no
charitable tranche, it is not subject to the no-inurement rule. You may
welcome this structure because it frees the Cheap Stove Project from
the burden of regulation that accompanies tax-deductible charitable
dollars.134

133

See Chance Barnett, Top 10 Crowdfunding Sites For Fundraising, FORBES (May 8,
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/05/08/top-10crowdfunding-sites-for-fundraising/; see also KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.
com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014); CROWDFUNDER, https://www.crowdfunder.com
(discussing various crown-sourcing websites) (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
134
This is the “de-regulatory impulse” discussed supra in the Introduction to this
Article.
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But, what at first seems like a burden of the Cookstove Project—
that it has a charitable investor and therefore is subject to the noinurement rule—actually gives you a significant benefit.135 First, you
know that the enterprise has an investor that has more resources than
you have to evaluate the terms of the subsidizing investment, and
potentially to monitor the investment to make sure that it is used to
advance the social purpose. From an agency-cost point of view, the
existence of a larger institutional investor is a huge benefit to you,
because you can free-ride on its analysis, contracting, and monitoring.
But their efforts only reduce your agency costs if you feel confident
that they share your interests. If their interests diverge from yours,
then there is no value in free-riding on their supervision over your
mutual agent.
The private inurement regime is potentially your best assurance
(although it is obviously far from complete) that the charitable
investor shares your interest in the social mission of the firm. That is
because removing the ability of the charitable investor to divert funds
to her own pocket decreases the chances that she will do so. So, as a
social investor, the existence of a charitable tranche that is bound by
the private inurement rule means that the government will protect
your reasonable expectation that the charitable investor will not divert
funds to her pocket.
There are two huge caveats to the argument above. The first is
that the charitable tranche protects your interest only if your interest
is in the social mission of the enterprise. Remember, the Cookstove
Project has two purposes: social and financial. You are investing in
both. If you are more worried about the Cookstove Project failing to
provide sufficient financial benefits than you are about the Cookstove
Project providing sufficient financial returns, then the existence of an
independent charitable investor gets you nothing. But in that case, the
existence of market-rate financial investors should provide the
assurances you want. As long as you are comfortable with the
differences between your investment and theirs, their desire to profit
may provide some assurance that the financial mission of the
enterprise will not be ignored, though the gap between the terms of
your deal and of theirs is very important to that calculation.
The second major caveat, though, is that this analysis does not
apply to situations in which you have developed a better system to
monitor and enforce the social mission of the enterprise. If you can

135

This is the “regulatory impulse” discussed supra in the Introduction to this
Article.
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make a contract with the Cookstove Project in which social benefit is
quantified with sufficient clarity and precision that your monitoring
and enforcement costs are not higher than the costs associated with the
private inurement regime, then that private system is more efficient
than the importation of the private inurement regime.136 In that case,
you should invest in the Cheap Stoves Project and not the Cookstove
Project. But in the absence of that situation, which I suspect is less
common than some commentators might wish, the existence of a
charitable tranche that is clearly subject to the private inurement
regime—and therefore is made up of independent people—can be
very useful to an individual contemplating making a subsidizing
investment in a social enterprise.137 The application of the private
inurement rule enables the Cookstove Project to make a credible
commitment to potential investors that a board of independent
persons (the Earth Charity) has made an independent evaluation of
the terms of the subsidizing investment and has decided that it is
worthwhile from the perspective of the Cookstove Project’s social
mission.
Basically, the benefits of enforcing a clarified private inurement
regime on a social enterprise with a tranche of investors or donors
using charitable funds are threefold. If we think of the Cookstove
Project, we can see that the first benefit of enforcing the private
inurement regime is that doing so protects the reasonable
136

Also, if your social goals are very well expressed by third-party verifiers of social
benefit, like the non-profit B-Lab. See BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.
net/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). You may be able to cheaply rely on them to monitor
social benefit. But that solution only works if they are diligent in their monitoring,
and if your social goals are the same as those factors that B Lab measures.
137
Brian Galle does an excellent job of identifying some situations in which the
social good provided by the social enterprise is relatively easily identified, measured,
and monitored. For example, a firm operating in an industry that “kills dolphins,
poisons the water, sells ‘conflict diamonds,’ [or] hired developing-world workers at
pennies per hour” may have to “sell its products at a discount, pay out higher rates of
return to investors, pay managers a premium, or all of the above.” Galle, supra note 3,
at 2037. He cleverly calls the problem these firms face “cold glow” and discusses
mechanisms these firms use to “warm” these cold glow effects. Id. He points out that
some of the innovations in social enterprise legal forms may be addressed to more
efficiently warming cold glow. But these cold glow firms are just a subset of the more
general category of firms who pursue social goods that are (relatively) easily
quantified, monitored, and enforced. In situations in which social goods are easily
quantified, measured and enforced, so-called “agency theory” would predict that
patrons and producers of such social goods might not choose the non-profit form, and
no subsidized charitable dollars would be needed to spur pursuit of them. Agency
theory predicts that the non-profit form is embraced to overcome problems associated
with quantifying, measuring and enforcing commitments regarding social goods.
These firms providing easily quantified social goods may be housed in traditional forprofit corporations, or new social enterprise entities, like benefit corporations.
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expectations of those people who donated to the Earth Charity. They
chose to contribute their funds subject to a legal regime that prevented
managers or other insiders in the Earth Charity from diverting those
donated funds to themselves, and they presumably did so because they
thought that was the most efficient way to advance their social mission.
Second, enforcing the private inurement regime advances the
government’s interest (also called the taxpayers’ interests) by
preventing money that has been subsidized with tax benefits from
being diverted into the pockets of the managers of the Earth Charity.
The government provided these tax benefits to the Earth Charity
under an understanding that the private inurement regime would
apply, and we should assume that it did so because of its own agencycost analysis. Permitting the Earth Charity to use its funds to enrich
managers of the Earth Charity through the Cookstove Project would
violate the reasonable expectation under which the government
operated when it chose to provide tax subsidies only to organizations
bound by the private inurement regime.
The third benefit, however, may be the most important. By
enforcing the private inurement regime against the Cookstove Project
only when it has a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds, the law
creates a mechanism for the Cookstove Project to create a signal to
those social investors who are not using charitable funds. It enables
the Cookstove Project to say, in effect, there are some social investors just
like you who think this is a good project, and none of them stand to get personally
rich from it. If other investors want to free-ride on the judgment of those
independent charitable investors, they are free to do so. On the other
hand, if there is no tranche of charitable funds, the Cookstove Project
is clearly communicating the opposite: that there is no tranche of
social investors who are legally required to be independent. No
regulatory effort is being made in any way to ensure the independence
of any social investors. If that is not important to the Cookstove
Project, it can opt out of receiving charitable dollars. If it is important
to the Cookstove Project, it can opt in. The regulatory regime permits
the Cookstove Project to choose how to signal the market. It provides
an opportunity that may well be valuable, but not a requirement if the
Cookstove Project decides it is not valuable. It can always choose to
forego charitable dollars.138

138

Remember, it can even accept donations for its project without accepting
charitable dollars. Arguably, the only limitation is that the donor cannot make the
donation on a tax-deductible basis, and the social enterprise cannot earn its income
tax-free.
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IV. PRIVATE BENEFIT LEGAL REGIME
If the private inurement regime is justified because it provides a
mechanism to satisfy the “regulatory” goals of the social enterprise
legal reform movement, the same cannot necessarily be said of the rest
of the rules that the IRS potentially imposes on social enterprises.
Social enterprise legal reformers are not wrong when they say that the
federal laws that apply to social enterprises are confusing and
potentially prevent charities from investing in socially beneficial social
enterprises.139 Other scholars have addressed the so-called “programrelated investment” rules that apply only to private foundations,140 and
so I do not address those rules here, but none has yet adequately
addressed the second major regulatory regime that applies to all
charities, the “private benefit regime.” The private benefit doctrine is
far more ambiguous and therefore potentially far more restrictive than
the private inurement doctrine, and it therefore has the potential to
severely restrict the workability of tranched investment strategies if it is
not properly cabined. And there is no doubt that from the IRS’s
perspective, a tranched social enterprise “is ripe for private benefit
analysis.”141
This section, introduces the private benefit regime and argues
that—unlike the private inurement regime, which is essential to
combatting malfeasance by unscrupulous social entrepreneurs and to
properly aligning incentives—the private benefit regime should be
narrowed to apply only in certain clearly-defined situations. In the case
of the Private Benefit Regime, that means liberalizing the law to make
clear that (1) the mere fact that a subsidizing investment may confer
an “excess benefit” on market-tranche investors does not constitute a
violation of the private benefit doctrine, and (2) an investment in a
social enterprise that constituted a relatively small share of a charity’s
total operational budget (or an ancillary joint venture) does not
require that the charity maintain ongoing formal control over the
organization. Instead, a wide range of commitment mechanisms that
the charity deems sufficient to ensure that the investment is used to
advance the charity’s tax-exempt purpose are permissible.

139
140
141

See, e,g., Archer, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 15.
Archer, supra note 13, at 188.
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A. Private Benefit Doctrine
The private benefit doctrine is an ill-defined legal constraint on
the activities of exempt organizations. Law professor John Colombo
has pointed out that the IRS used the doctrine to constrain a wide
range of disparate activities without giving any a precise description of
its scope.142 Unlike the private inurement doctrine, there is no direct
statutory source for the private benefit doctrine. Instead, it is rooted
in the Treasury Regulations, which interpret the requirement in IRC §
501(c)(3) that a charitable organization be “organized and operated
exclusively for” a charitable purpose.143 In describing what charitable
purposes qualify, the regulations state that an organization is not
operated for a charitable purpose unless “it serves a public rather than
a private interest.”144
The regulations go on to explain that “it is necessary for an
organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the
benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or
his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled,
directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”145 Because of its focus
on persons who influence the organization (“the creator or his family,
shareholders”), this sounds very much like a sort of re-stating of the
private inurement doctrine.146 But unlike the private inurement
doctrine, the private benefit doctrine has been held to apply even
when the benefited party is not an insider to the charity at all.147 In
other words, the list of “designated individuals” is illustrative only, and
an organization can fail to have a “public purpose” if it excessively
benefits any person, even if that person exercises no influence or
control over the organization.
The second big difference between the private inurement
doctrine and the private benefit doctrine is that the private inurement
doctrine is an absolute ban. If any excessive benefits are paid to
142

Colombo, supra note 78, at 1064 (“Despite the IRS’s broad invocation of private
benefit as a policing tool, however (or perhaps precisely because of its broad invocation
of it), no one really can define the doctrine.”) (emphasis added).
143
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
144
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii)(2008)(emphasis added).
145
Id. (emphasis added).
146
See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1068 (“On first glance, the language in the
regulation cited above would seem to be little more than an augmented explanation
of the statutory private inurement limitation.”).
147
See United Cancer Council, Inc v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (1999) (“[A]
violation of [the charity’s duty of care] which involved the dissipation of the charity’s
assets might . . . support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit,
even if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue influence over, the
charity.”).
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disqualified persons, then a charity can lose its exempt status or owe
excess benefit transaction penalties. The private benefit doctrine,
however, is a clarification of the requirement that a charity have
exempt purposes and is derived from a regulation that states that a
charity has a public rather than a private purpose.148 Therefore, for a
private benefit to disqualify a charity for exempt status, it must be
substantial enough that it overwhelms the charity’s public purpose.149
But it is not at all clear how substantial a private benefit has to be
to disqualify an organization from tax-exempt status. The Supreme
Court has stated that “the presence of a single [non-exempt] purpose,
if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the
number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.”150
Thus,
apparently, the question of how substantial a private benefit must be is
not strictly quantitative. In other words, it is not sufficient to measure
the activities that advance the organization’s charitable purpose and
compare them to those that advance the private benefit to ensure that
some acceptable ratio of charitable activities is met. However, it is also
not clear what the right measure should be. The IRS has taken the
position that a private benefit must be “insubstantial”151 and that
insubstantiality should be measured both “qualitatively” and
“quantitatively.”152 But the reality is there is no identifiable standard by
148

Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)–1(e)(1) states:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its
activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of
the organization’s exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization
is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an
unrelated trade or business.
149
See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1072–73 (explaining that in General Council
Memorandum (GCM) 39598 (1987) the IRS took the position that the private benefit
doctrine differs from the private inurement doctrine both because it applies to any
economic arrangement with persons other than the charitable class (and not just
insiders), and because it involves a comparative weighing of private versus public
benefit (as opposed to any amount of inurement resulting in loss of exemption)).
150
Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, DC. Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283
(1945).
151
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS, at *14–15 (Jan. 23, 1987)
(“An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a private interest
more than incidentally . . . . If, however, the private benefit is only incidental to the
exempt purposes served, and not substantial, it will not result in a loss of exempt
status.”).
152
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS, at *15 states:
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental in both
a qualitative and a quantitative sense. In order to be incidental in a
qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the
activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be
accomplished only by benefitting certain private individuals.
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which to measure private benefit.
Law professor John Colombo has pointed out that in the
uncertainty over the law of private benefit, there are two primary ways
in which it might be applied in the future. One way it could be
employed would be as a general check on economic transactions with
unrelated third parties. In this reading, the private benefit doctrine
applies to any economic transaction in which charitable assets are
improperly diverted to someone other than the charitable
beneficiaries. As noted above, Judge Posner suggested in United Cancer
Council that negligent improper diversions of charitable assets to
private persons (breaches of the directors’ duties of care) might
constitute violations of the private benefit doctrine.153 Under this
analysis, the private benefit doctrine would function similarly to the
private inurement doctrine, but without any requirement that that
benefited party be an insider. This interpretation of the private benefit
doctrine creates significant risk to investors since it can exist in any
organization no matter the quantity of legitimate tax-exempt activities
conducted.154 In addition, there is no way to protect against this
application of the private benefit doctrine by providing benefits only
to “independent” persons because there is no requirement that the
benefited person be a disqualified person or an insider. It is plausible
that the measure of what constitutes a private benefit would be
exported from the private inurement regime, and any “excess benefit
transaction” would constitute a violation, even when the transaction
was between the organization and a truly unrelated third party.
Obviously, if this analysis applied, a charity that invests in a
“subsidizing tranche” in a social enterprise could easily have a private
benefit problem. As discussed above, it is very difficult to measure a
“market rate” return on capital, especially if the capital investment
results in an “equity-like return.” Therefore, the use of a tranched
investment structure in the Cookstove Project likely constitutes at least
prima facie evidence of an excessive benefit flowing to the subsidized
153

See supra note 147.
Theoretically, at least, there is no reason why the private benefit doctrine should
be confined to situations in which a person receives an excessive benefit. Because the
private benefit doctrine is really just an elaboration of the requirement that a charity
have a proper tax-exempt purpose, provision of a substantial enough private benefit
should result in revocation of tax-exempt status even if the benefit is not excessive.
There is a plausible argument that the IRS has addressed this issue by treating excessive
private benefits as “qualitatively substantial” even if they are not “quantitatively
substantial.” Obviously a doctrine that potentially applies notwithstanding the fact that
no insiders have been benefited and notwithstanding the fact that no excessive benefit
has been identified is potentially a very broad doctrine. The doctrine’s application
relies entirely on the “substantiality” of the private benefit.
154
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tranche. Under the Private Inurement regime, the Cookstove Project
can protect itself from the adverse legal effects of that purported
excessive benefit by preventing disqualified persons from investing in
the subsidized tranche. But because the private benefit doctrine has
no “insider” requirement, an interpretation that made any possibly
excessive benefit problematic would make tranche investing virtually
impossible.
The other way Professor Colombo thinks the private benefit
doctrine could be employed by the IRS in the future would be to
restrict the doctrine to those situations in which some non-charitable
purpose has overwhelmed the charitable purpose of the organization
so that the organization no longer really serves its charitable goals.
This approach would involve a comparison of charitable activities with
private benefit activities, such that a sufficient quantity of genuinely
charitable activities would protect an organization from violation of
the private benefit doctrine.155 Thus, this approach is unlikely to
present a problem when the transaction in question is merely ancillary
to the primary activities of the charity. Under this analysis, if the
amount of the Earth Charity’s investment in the Cookstove Project is
small in relation to its overall activities, then this form of the private
benefit doctrine is unlikely to be problematic. Unfortunately, an
investor could not be assured that the IRS will interpret the private
benefit doctrine in this “quantitative” way. Quite the contrary, there is
reason to believe that the IRS does not view the private benefit doctrine
as one that is overcome if the quantity of private benefit is less than
some fixed proportion of the overall activities of the charity.156
B. Joint Venture Analysis
In addition to standing alone, the private benefit doctrine serves
as the basis for the IRS’s guidance on joint ventures between exempt
organizations and for-profit partners.157 In its joint venture analysis,
155

Because of its comparative approach, this interpretation of the private benefit
doctrine has echoes in other doctrines that constrain exempt organizations, like the
“commerciality doctrine” and the “commensurate in scope” doctrine. See generally
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (10th ed. 2011).
156
See supra note 151.
157
The IRS’s interpretation of what constitutes a joint venture such that its joint
venture analysis would apply is quite broad. See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT
VENTURES INVOLVING TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 292 (3rd ed. 2007) (“The term ‘joint
venture’ in this context includes a partnership as well as any other arrangement that
accomplishes a comparable sharing or redistribution of benefits and burdens.”). It is
not clear that every tranched social enterprise would constitute a joint venture for the
IRS’s purposes, but it is likely that one like the Cookstove Project, in which the Earth
Charity and private investors each had equity-type interests in an LLC, would.
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the IRS has replicated the ambiguity inherent in the private benefit
doctrine.158 Just as it is unclear whether the private benefit doctrine is
only a means of ensuring that the organization has a sufficiently
substantial charitable purpose to justify tax exemption or also a
mechanism by which the IRS to monitors the organization’s economic
transactions with outsiders, so too the IRS’s joint venture doctrine
potentially serves both functions.159 It is not clear from the IRS’s
guidance on joint ventures whether its joint venture analysis is solely a
way to ensure that an exempt organization involved in a joint venture
with a non-exempt partner continues to pursue its charitable purpose,
or whether it is also a means to ensure that the charitable partner does
not provide excessive benefits to its for-profit partner.160
That ambiguity comes from the fact that the IRS’s guidance
breaks joint ventures into two distinct categories: whole venture joint
ventures161 and ancillary joint ventures. A whole venture joint venture
is one in which a charity conducts all of its tax-exempt activities
through the joint venture. In that case, obviously, since participating
in the joint venture is all that the charity does, it must adequately
advance the charity’s tax-exempt purpose to justify exemption. The
IRS has been relatively clear that it believes that a whole-venture joint
venture potentially calls into question the charity’s tax-exempt status
Regardless of whether the specific enterprise constitutes a joint venture, the IRS’s
guidance on joint ventures gives some insight into its evolving interpretation of the
private benefit doctrine’s application.
158
The author of the leading treatise on the topic describes the IRS’s approach to
joint ventures with exempt organizations as “prohibitively restrictive” and governed by
“inscrutable laws.” Id. at xviii.
159
In Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on Exempt Organizations
in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 31 (2006), Nicholas A. Mirkay writes:
It is this broad scope of the private benefit doctrine, which encompasses
and examines all of an organization’s activities (i.e., exempt activities,
transactions with insiders and/or with unrelated disinterested persons),
that has resulted in an aggressive expansion and application of the
doctrine by the IRS in the context of joint ventures.
160
Historically, it has certainly been the case that the IRS was concerned with the
potential for joint ventures to result in private benefit or private inurement as well as
whether they would divert the organization from its tax-exempt purposes. In service
of this goal, “the IRS will look at relative capital contributions and risks of the various
joint ventures to determine whether capital contributions are proportionate to the
sharing of profits and losses, among other indicators.” Sanders, supra note 157, at 293.
Remember, in a tranched social enterprise, capital contributions are not proportionate
to profits and losses, but instead the charitable tranche provides more capital in
exchange for less profits. Under the IRS’s historical analysis, at least, this situation
would raise red flags.
161
IRS guidance actually only refers to a “whole hospital” joint venture, since that
was the situation it addressed, and some commentators have adopted the term “whole
entity” joint venture. See id. at 25–26.

LEFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/15/2015 5:06 PM

PREVENTING PRIVATE INUREMENT

53

unless the charity exercises formal meaningful control over the joint
venture.162
In an ancillary joint venture, on the other hand, the charity
conducts other activities that justify its tax-exempt status, and the joint
venture is a relatively small part of the charity’s activities. In this case,
if the activities are “incidental” to the charity’s other tax-exempt
activities, then they should not call into question the charity’s taxexempt status even if they do not advance the charity’s exempt
purpose. This is because, as discussed above, a charity is permitted to
engage in some activities that do not advance its tax-exempt purpose,
so long as these activities are incidental in relation to the charity’s
overall activities.163 However, the IRS’s guidance on ancillary joint
ventures is much more ambiguous than its guidance on whole venture
joint ventures. The IRS has communicated that in the case of ancillary
joint ventures, it does not hold the charity to the same control standard
that applies in the whole venture context.164 It would be logical to
conclude that an ancillary joint venture does not require control,
because ancillary activities, whether they provide a public benefit or
not, are sufficiently insubstantial that they cannot prevent the
organization from primarily advancing its tax-exempt purpose.165 But
the rule with regards to ancillary joint ventures is surprisingly
underdeveloped.166 The IRS has arguably signaled that, at least
sometimes, it is necessary for the charity to exercise ongoing control
over an ancillary joint venture.167 Or, possibly, the IRS could take the
162

See Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d per curiam, 242
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. See also St. David’s Health
Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the control test,
vacating, and remanding to resolve a genuine issue of material fact about whether St.
David’s exercised sufficient control over the joint venture).
163
See supra discussion accompanying notes 148–152.
164
See Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974. (holding that “[the whole venture]
continues to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) when it contributes a portion of
its assets to and conducts a portion of its activities through [an ancillary joint
venture]”).
165
Paul Streckfus has described this interpretation of Rev. Rul. 2004-51 as “the
majority view.” Paul Streckfus, Ancillary Joint Ventures May Involve Exemption Risk, 47
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 327, 327 (2005). He writes:
The majority view is that the only risk posed by an ancillary joint venture
to an EO is that its distributive share of joint venture income may be
subject to the unrelated business income tax, but—and here’s the good
news—participation in such a venture poses no threat to exempt status.
166
See Sanders, supra note 157.
167
See Mirkay, supra note 19, at 59 (“[A]n IRS representative unofficially issued a
poignant reminder—Revenue Ruling 98-15 is ‘still on the books’ and ‘Revenue Ruling
2004-51 does nothing to modify Revenue Ruling 98-15.’”). Mayer and Ganahl, among
others, adopt this interpretation of the IRS’s position that Rev. Rul. 2004-51 ruled:
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position that a joint venture is not “insubstantial” even though it
constitutes only a small part of what a charity does.168
In any case, if the joint venture is substantial enough, the IRS
demands that the charity must “control” the joint venture. In a “whole
hospital” joint venture, the charity must have ongoing formal control.
In the case of an ancillary joint venture, the control standard may be
more permissive, and may require not formal control, but only
effective control over the parts of the joint venture relevant to the
charity’s tax-exempt purpose. In the case of the Cookstove Project, it
may be sufficient for the charity to be able to control certain key
choices in the distribution of cookstoves, like the criteria for receiving
one, but it may also be important for the charity to retain ongoing
control over sources of ethanol, given the evidence that clear-cutting
forests to produce ethanol has adverse environmental effects. But
some form of control might be required, and if the social enterprise
did not want to cede overall formal control to the charity, guidance on
what type of control would be sufficient does not clearly exist.169

[I]n a situation where only an insubstantial part of a tax-exempt
organization’s activities are housed in a partnership, it will be sufficient
for the tax-exempt organization to only appoint half of the partnership’s
governing body if the tax-exempt organization has other means of
controlling the substance of the partnership’s activities to ensure those
activities further the tax-exempt organization’s exempt purpose.
Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at n.155.
168
See discussion supra note 152.
169
Archer argues that the “expenditure responsibility” requirements that apply to
foundations making grants to, or program-related investments in, for-profit entities
should constitute sufficient “control” to satisfy the IRS’s control standard in social
enterprise contexts. See Archer, supra note 13, at 192–96. Whether or not the
expenditure responsibility rules could require the right balance of flexibility and
control, if they were interpreted correctly, how one would interpret such rules in the
context of an equity investment in a social enterprise remains unclear. The
expenditure responsibility rules require that a foundation “establish adequate
procedures . . . to see that the grant [or investment] is spent solely for the purposes
for which made.” I.R.C. §4945(h)(1) (2006). This requirement means that a private
foundation making a program related investment must obtain an agreement that the
recipient will “use all the funds received from the private foundation . . . only for the
purposes of the investment and to repay any portion not used for such purposes.”
Treas. Reg. §53.4945-5(b)(4)(i)(1972). It is hard to conceive of how this requirement
would apply to a subsidizing equity investment in a tranched social enterprise, since
the investment is intended to improve the profitability or lessen the risk of the
subsidized tranche. In a Private Letter Ruling that addresses equity investments by
foundations in for-profit enterprises, the return-on-investment between the
foundations and the market investors were proportional to their capital contributions.
See I.R.S. P.L.R. 2006-10020 (Mar. 10, 2006). There is no guidance from the IRS that
analyses a tranched structure.
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As Ofer Eldar has made clear, control is only one of a number of
commitment devices that social enterprises use to ensure that their
activities truly advance their social missions.170 Other such devices
include certification mechanisms, in which third parties certify
compliance with certain standards,171 and contractual mechanisms, in
which compliance with social benefit goals are monitored and
enforced contractually.172 Other areas of the law, such as the
“expenditure responsibility” regime that applies to private foundation
grants to non-public charities, envision a number of mechanisms other
than direct control by which an organization would ensure that its
investment is used in an appropriate manner to advance its tax-exempt
purpose.173
The point is that in situations in which there is no private
inurement because no disqualified persons stand to gain from a
subsidizing investment by a charity, it is not clear why ongoing formal
control is necessary. Current law is ambiguous about what is required,
but there is at least a strong risk that the IRS will require some
undefined quantum of formal control even when a joint venture is
small in relation to a charity’s overall activities. Because there are a
variety of ways for a charity to make sure that its investment is not
diverted from its social mission, the charity’s independence should
gain it significant latitude to choose the best one.
C. Clarifying or Liberalizing the Private Benefit Regime
Thus, one thing is very clear: the Private Benefit Regime analysis
is more uncertain than the Private Inurement Regime and potentially
creates a much bigger barrier to a tranche investing structure for the
Cookstove Project. That is because it is impossible to avoid the
potential application of the doctrine by finding an “independent”
charitable investor. Without the ability to avoid loss of exemption in a
certain way, some number of investments in social enterprises will be
chilled.
There are several reasons why the enforcement of the private
benefit regime is less compelling than the private inurement regime
in the social enterprise context. The first is the simple point that the
risk of diversion of assets or energy away from the social mission is
decreased when the members of the subsidized tranche are not
disqualified persons. The second centers around the notion that
170
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Eldar, supra note 1, at 40–48.
Eldar, supra note 1, at 46.
Eldar, supra note 1, at 48.
See Archer, supra note 13, at 191–96.
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confusion itself is a bad thing, since it is dangerous to enter into
investments if one is unsure of the law that the IRS will apply. Finally,
the effect of an overly restrictive regime is likely to be to push social
enterprises into alternate structures that avoid the reach of the IRS. As
discussed above, a social enterprise that does not use charitable funds
can avoid tax-exempt organizations law entirely. The cost of pushing
social enterprises into such structures is that they then lose the
commitment and signaling benefits of the private inurement regime.
First, the reason that the no inurement regime applies only to
insiders is because there is a presumption that the ability to distribute
profits to oneself is a strong incentive to divert funds from the
organization’s charitable mission. In order for outsiders to divert
charitable funds to themselves, they must first persuade insiders that
such diversions are a good idea. The whole edifice of non-profit law is
built on the belief that the existence of independent directors and
other controllers creates at least some barrier to such diversion of
funds.174 If that belief is at all true, then the risk of diversion decreases
when the benefited persons are not in positions of control over the
charitable organization. Obviously, it does not reduce the risk to zero,
but it nonetheless reduces the risk.
Second, if the law of non-profit organizations is meant to protect
the reasonable expectations of donors and the government, then it is
important for such stakeholders to understand what can be reasonably
expected.
As discussed above, significant disagreement exists
regarding whether the private benefit regime is primarily a restriction
on the quantity of resources that a single charitable investor can devote
to a social enterprise or whether it is primarily a check on whether such
investments provide excess benefits to for-profit investors. If the goal of
non-profit law is to enable donors (and the government) to choose a
legal structure that most efficiently enables them to pursue their social
mission, then ambiguity about the central effect of the law almost
certainly creates inefficient outcomes. How could a donor make a
decision about whether to provide funds through a tax-exempt nonprofit if she cannot predict what types of restrictions attach to such a
contribution? Likewise, the whole point of the government providing
tax benefits to organizations that abide by a specific set of rules is that
174

John Colombo summarized this instinct nicely:
[I]t is hard to imagine a situation in which a charity intentionally diverts
assets at less than fair market value to an outsider. If a charity enters into
an economic transaction with someone who has no influence over the
charity, there is . . . simply no reason to believe that the charity would
intentionally hand assets over to that person for less than full value.
Columbo, supra note 78, at 1084.
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those rules require generalized responses. Therefore, uncertainty in
the law does not benefit the government in this context either.
Finally, an overly restrictive or confusing private benefit regime
decreases the utility of tax-exempt organization law as a commitment
or signaling mechanism. As is discussed above, the existence of a
charitable tranche in a social investment can be a powerful signal to
social investors who are not using charitable funds. These social
investors are seeking social enterprises that can make credible
commitments that they are pursuing a social mission—what I have
called the regulatory impulse. Because the existence of a tranche of
charitable funds implicates the law of tax-exempt organizations, a
tranched social enterprise can use IRS enforcement of the law to make
a credible commitment that it will observe certain rules in pursuing its
social mission. If those rules are unclear, its commitment is valueless
to social investors. In the case of a private benefit regime that may or
may not limit the quantity of funds a charitable investor can invest and
may or may not provide a check on whether the IRS takes an interest
in whether the charitable investment creates an “excess benefit” for the
market tranche investors, the “signal” lacks enough clarity to have any
effect.
This can be damaging whether the social investors
underappreciate the force of the law (and think they are making an
investment in a permissive regime when really it is more restrictive) or
if they overestimate the force of the law (thinking that the IRS is
preventing certain types of abuse, for example, which are really just
not covered by the private benefit regime). Thus, uncertainty in the
law creates confusion that diminishes the value of the regulatory
regime for a variety of stakeholders in a social enterprise. As discussed
above, social investors have a choice about where to invest. If the IRS
interprets the private benefit regime to prevent tranched investing,
social investors can always invest in social enterprises that have no
charitable capital. But, if they do so, they lose the powerful regulatory
benefits of enforcement of the no inurement regime.
If lack of clarity in the private benefit doctrine prevents socially
beneficial social enterprises from being created, then the IRS should
clarify the doctrine. A number of proposals exist for clarifying the
proper scope of the private benefit regime.175 They share some basic
characteristics and differ on others. It is probably the case that any of
them would be better than none, but analyzing the proposals’ effect
on tranched social enterprises uncovers some relative strengths and
175

See, e.g., John D. Colombo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects
of Joint Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187–90 (2001); Mirkay, supra note 19, at 69;
Sanders, supra note 157.
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weaknesses between the proposals.
Some proposals focus on the fact that the private benefit doctrine
prohibits only activities that are substantial, and so the doctrine should
be clarified with some bright-line quantification method for measuring
substantiality. Under these tests, a charity engaged in both direct
charitable activities and transactions that benefit private persons would
not have to worry about the transactions with private persons so long
as they constituted less than some fixed percentage of their overall
activities. For example, Michael Sanders proposes that an organization
that invested less than ten to fifteen percent of its assets in joint
ventures with for-profit entities should be safe from threat of private
benefit analysis.176 If this analysis were applied to the Earth Charity’s
investment in the Cookstove Project, it would mean that the Earth
Charity could be free from anxiety about the private benefit
transaction so long as its investments in the Cookstove Project—along
with all other investments in social enterprises—constituted only a
small part of its overall activities.
This solution has the benefit of clarity, since an organization can
have confidence that its transaction does not risk its tax-exempt status,
but it has some weaknesses as well. For example, if the Earth Charity
wanted to specialize exclusively in making investments in social
enterprises, it would be prevented from doing so. As soon as its
aggregate investments exceeded 10 or 15 percent of its overall activity
it would lose the certainty that its tax-exempt status was safe. Since
there are no doubt economies of scale and scope in making
investments in social enterprises, it would be unfortunate to prevent
firms from specializing in such investments if there was no good
justification for doing so.
Other proposals focus on the question of whether the possible
private benefit activity advances the tax-exempt purpose of the
charity.177 For example, in the case of the Earth Charity’s investment
in the Cookstove Project, the only relevant question would be whether
creating a market for propane cookstoves in developing countries
advanced the Earth Charity’s mission of helping poor people and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, the problem with this
question is that it seems open-ended and could therefore subject the
charity to risk that the IRS would disagree with them. Luckily, charities
are already required to determine if revenue-generating activities are
176

See Sanders, supra note 157, at 223 § 4.5(c). See also Mirkay, supra note 19, at

66–67.
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See John D. Colombo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint
Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187 (2001); see also Mirkay, supra note 19, at 65.
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“connected” to the tax-exempt purposes, since the IRS requires
payment of a so-called “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT) on the
profits from any trade or business that is not related to their tax-exempt
purpose.178 Since the organization is already required to do an analysis
of the connection between its revenue-generating activities and its taxexempt purposes in order to comply with the UBIT rules, John
Colombo argues that the private benefit regime should be collapsed
into the UBIT regime.179 He proposes that a charity should be able to
be confident that it will not lose its tax-exempt status so long as its
UBIT-generating activities are not excessive.180 Thus, if the Earth
Charity wanted to specialize in making subsidizing investments in
social enterprises like the Cookstove Project, it could do so confidently
as long as it felt confident that most investments were sufficiently
connected to its tax-exempt purposes that they would not generate
UBIT.
This approach has the benefit of overall clarity (because it has a
fixed percentage above which an organization cannot go), but it also
has the benefit of permitting social investing as long as the investment
advances the charitable purposes of the organization. In these ways, it
appears to be both closer to purpose of the private benefit regime,
given its origin in the purposes clause of 501(c)(3), and more
permissive of social enterprises.
Both Colombo’s and Sanders’s approaches prevent the IRS from
using the private benefit regime to police “excessive” transactions with
non-insiders. They do not permit the private benefit doctrine to police
corporate waste or duty of care to efficiently pursue the charity’s taxexempt status, in the way that Judge Posner suggested it might in dicta
in the United Cancer Council case.181 But this restriction of the private
benefit doctrine is exactly the strength of both proposals. If the IRS
used the private benefit doctrine to police “excessive” transactions with
non-insiders, it is unclear how they could do so in a way that would give
any clarity to charities about when their transactions were safe from
scrutiny. If the standard was the same as in the private inurement
regime, then all it would do was apply the “excess benefit” portion of
the standard in cases in which the recipient of a benefit is not a
disqualified person. That reads the whole “disqualified person”
analysis out of the law and removes any incentive charities have under
current law to enter into transactions with independent persons.
178
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180
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I.R.C. §§ 512, 513, with some exceptions.
See Colombo, supra note 177, at 189.
See Colombo, supra note 177, at 189.
See supra discussion accompanying note 147.
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Unless it is restricted under one of the theories proposed, the
private benefit doctrine potentially allows the IRS discretion to police
whether a social investment’s terms are too generous. For example, in
the case of the Earth Charity’s investment in the Cookstove Project,
imagine that the project was a huge success and the market investors
doubled their money.182 Unless there were strong, clear guidance to
prevent the IRS from treating such a transaction as a private benefit
transaction, the Earth Charity may reasonably worry that investments
in social enterprises carried excessive risk under the private benefit
regime.
But protecting against excessive benefit is exactly what the private
inurement regime is designed to do, and it rests on a presumption that
an independent charity is the best guarantor of social benefit. The
structure of tax-exempt organizations rests on a calculated guess that a
charity controlled by persons who do not stand to personally profit
from the financial success of an enterprise are the best agents for its
social mission.183 At the end of the day, the appropriate question to ask
of this approach is whether the IRS needs a mechanism to oversee the
quality of transactions under the private benefit regime as well as the
private inurement regime. This Article argues that using the private
benefit regime to police the quality of transactions with private parties
is not beneficial. That task should be left to the private inurement
regime.
CONCLUSION
Social enterprise legal reformers have been arguing for several
years that there is an untapped potential for advancing the social good
if only we could get the laws right. Among other things, they have been
arguing that significant social value could be created if we were to
provide a clear legal mechanism for social enterprises to combine
182

Imagine in addition that the Earth Charity failed to require that the Cookstove
Project require that its ethanol producers refrain from clear-cutting forests to produce
its ethanol, and that ethanol produced from clear-cutting is worse from a globalwarming perspective than charcoal production.
183
In In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2006), John D. Colombo
writes:
If a charity enters into an economic transaction with someone who has
no influence over the charity, there is simply no reason to believe that
the charity would intentionally hand assets over to that person for less
than full value . . . . [T]he notion that one would intentionally overpay
or undercharge for services outside a context in which the recipient of
the economic benefit has some kind of insider connection does not
comport with either basic assumptions of our tax system nor with normal
human economic behavior.
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social investors or donors and profit-driven investors in a single entity.
These reformers want laws to facilitate the creation of tranched social
enterprises that have a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds. I
remain somewhat skeptical about the magnitude of the social benefit
that could arise from legal reforms that facilitate this type of tranched
investing in social enterprises, but I am convinced that the laws should
facilitate experimentation and innovation when possible.
If experimentation has the possibility of bringing social value
(whether great or incremental), then it is worthwhile to clarify the
legal restrictions are necessary to preserve the value created by the
current regulatory regime, and which are extraneous. Most social
enterprise legal reformers (although not all) agree that it is important
to preserve the private inurement regime, even when they do not
elaborate on how the rule operates in the context of tranched social
enterprises.184 I have argued that the private inurement regime is
indeed justified and that its application to social enterprises should be
clarified and strengthened. The IRS should promulgate guidance
making clear that a subsidizing tranche in a social enterprise
presumptively creates an excess benefit for participants in the
subsidized tranche, and so disqualified persons should not be investors
in the subsidized tranche. The enforcement of this rule would
preserve the reasonable expectations of donors to charitable entities
and the government, and as an additional bonus, provides a potentially
important signaling function that could be used by tranched social
enterprises seeking to bind themselves to credible commitments with
regard to social goals.
On the other hand, an expansive reading of the private benefit
regime is less well justified. The lack of certainty it creates means that
it cannot enforce the reasonable expectations of the charitable donors
or the government and cannot provide a signaling function to
potential social investors outside of the charitable context. Even if the
private benefit regime were clarified, however, it would still not be
justified if its clarification involved taking an expansive view of what it
prohibited. This is because a private benefit doctrine that requires all
tranched social enterprises be controlled by charities or that permits
the IRS to substitute its own discretion about excessive benefits in the
social enterprise context is simply too restrictive. The risks involved in
184

For example, Susannah Camic Tahk acknowledges that the “elaborate rules
aimed at preventing nonprofits from misusing public subsidies” are important, and
that, therefore, “Congress and/or the IRS can design measures intended to stimulate
cross-sector collaborations so that those measures also minimize abusive transactions.”
Tahk, supra note 2, at 539–40.
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being overruled or second-guessed by the IRS would plausibly prevent
the board from making decisions that maximized social welfare, and
the result would be for social enterprises to choose entity structures
that avoided tax-exempt investors, in order to avoid the legal
constraints on those investors. The result would be to remove from
social investors the option of free-riding on the higher quality
decisions of charities bound by the no-inurement rule. Thus, the IRS
should issue guidance properly cabining the private benefit doctrine.
The difference between private inurement and private benefit is
about the regimes’ relation to “independence.” Under the private
inurement rule, we trust independent directors to act in the best
interests of the charity they oversee. We provide regulatory oversight
only when those directors’ independence is compromised. Under the
private benefit rule, we provide regulatory oversight regardless of the
role of an independent board. Thus, the private inurement regime
relies on a certain “logic of independence” that is ignored by the
private benefit regime. If we can trust the logic of independence to
prevent abusive transfers of charitable dollars, then we can have brightline rules in this area: no subsidizing investment of charitable dollars
in a joint venture with disqualified persons. If we cannot, then, this
leaves us with ambiguity, and ambiguity will prevent many transactions
from occurring (or, will force them to occur completely outside of the
reach of non-profit law, in which case private inurement is permitted).
The ultimate question is how much work “independence” can do.
While the question of how much work “independence” can do in
the regulation of social enterprises is ultimately beyond the scope of
this Article, I suggest that the social enterprise field is an ideal place to
begin experimentation on that very question. If we were to clarify the
law so it was clear how the private inurement regime applied to
tranched social enterprises (strongly) and how the private benefit
regime applied (weakly), we would empower social enterprises to opt
in or out of these two regimes by choosing whether to seek investments
from charitable sources. Without providing unnecessary barriers to
innovative structuring arrangement, we would empower a new
generation of social entrepreneurs to solve the world’s problems.
* **

